The way to buck history

The real question is how America should wield its power. For the past half century it has done so through alliances and global institutions and in a consensual manner. Now it faces new challenges — and not simply because of what the Bush administration has done. The old order is changing. The alliances forged during the Cold War are weakening. Institutions built to reflect the realities of 1945 — such as the UN Security Council — risk becoming anachronistic. But if the administration wishes to further weaken and indeed destroy these institutions and traditions — by dismissing or neglecting them — it must ask itself: What will take their place? By what means will America maintain its hegemony?

For some in the administration, the answer is obvious: America will act as it chooses to, using what allies it can find in any given situation. As a statement of fact this is sometimes the only approach Washington will be able to employ. But it is not a durable long-term strategy. It would require America to build new alliances and arrangements every time it faced a crisis. More important, operating in a conspicuously unconstrained way, in service of a strategy to maintain primacy, will paradoxically produce the very competition it hopes to avoid. The last two years are surely instructive. The Bush administration’s swagger has generated international opposition and active measures to thwart its will. Though countries like France and Russia cannot become great-power competitors simply because they want to — they need economic and military strength — they can use what influence they have to disrupt American policy, as they are doing over Iraq. In fact, the less responsibility we give them, the more freedom smaller powers have to make American goals difficult to achieve.

In many cases the United States simply can’t ‘‘go it alone’’. The current crises over North Korea, Iran’s nuclear programme and the leakage of fissile materials from Russia are all good examples. And while the United States can act largely by itself in certain special circumstances, such as Iraq, the fewer allies, bases and air rights it has, the higher the costs will be in American lives and treasure. And those costs will become unbearable if the United States has to both wage war and pay for post-war reconstruction on its own.

The war on terror has given the United States a core security interest in the stability of societies. Failed states can become terrorist havens. That means we must focus attention and expenditures on nation-building. For all its flaws, the United Nations is doing on-the-ground work to create stable societies in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Cambodia and Mozambique — and for the most part, it’s succeeding. The European Union and Japan pay most of these bills. Were Washington to move to an entirely ad hoc approach, why would the rest of the world agree to clean up its messes?

Fighting terror also requires constant cooperation with countries across the globe. America could not have captured Qaeda strategist Khalid Shaikh Mohammed without the active partnership of Pakistan. And yet if you ask Pakistanis what they have gotten for this, they will point out that American tariffs continue to strangle their textile industry and US aid remains meagre. Having asked for help in de-Islamizing their education system — a matter of crucial concern to America — they have received little. Meanwhile the overall tone of Bush administration foreign policy has made General Musharraf embarrassed to be pro-American.

The last pint is perhaps the most crucial one. Being pro-American should not be a political liability for our allies. The diplomatic fiasco over Turkey is an excellent example. For well over a year now it has been obvious to anyone watching that the Turkish people were deeply opposed to a war in Iraq. Yet the administration assumed that it could bully or bribe Turkey into giving it basing rights. But Turkey over the last year has become more democratic. The military is less willing to overrule politicians. The new ruling party, AK, is more open to internal debate than Turkey’s other parties. It allowed its members to vote freely on the motion to allow America basing rights, only to have it defeated. Since more than90 per cent of the Turks oppose giving America basing rights, this should not have been surprising. The administration wants democracy in the Middle East. Well, it got it.

As usual, diplomatic style played a role. ‘‘The way the US has been conducting the negotiations has been, in general, humiliating,’’ says a retired senior diplomat, Ozdem Sanberk.

The costs of this mishap are real. If Turkey allowed America to open a second front, we could end the war more quickly and with fewer casualties, and the thorny issues relating to Turkish-Kurdish relations could be more easily handled. But the larger lesson is surely that in an increasingly democratic world American power must be seen as legitimate not only by other governments but by their people. Does America really want a world in which it gets its way in the face of constant public anger only by twisting arms, offering bribes and allying with dictators?

There are many specific ways for the United States to rebuild its relations with the world. It can match its military build-up with diplomatic efforts that demonstrate its interest and engagement in the world’s problems. It can stop over-subsidising American steelworkers, farmers and textile-mill owners, and open its borders to goods from poorer countries.

But above all, it must make the world comfortable with its power by leading through consensus. America’s special role in the world — its ability to buck history — is based not simply on its great strength, but on a global faith that this power is legitimate. If America squanders that, the loss will outweigh any gains in domestic security. And this next American century could prove to be lonely, brutish and short.

Concluded.
Courtesy: Newsweek Inc.