The swing state

It was fashionable until recently to suggest India does not even figure on China’s radar screen. Beijing used to see India as a local power in South Asia tied down by its perennial rivalry with Pakistan. Thanks to the stellar economic performance and some creative diplomacy, China’s perception of India has begun to change. After India’s nuclear deal with the US and the expanding military engagement between the world’s two largest democracies, New Delhi has begun to get a lot more of Beijing’s attention, and some grudging respect. Unlike the Indian political classes traditionally prone to ideological posturing and diplomatic self-deception, Chinese communists have a healthy deference to power and its unambiguous assertion. The closer New Delhi draws to Washington and Tokyo, the greater will be the incentive for China to take India seriously.

That India has figured out this simple truth is evident from the UPA government’s decision to press ahead with the current naval exercises in the Bay of Bengal despite the noisy opposition from its communist allies. New Delhi also appears to have finally broken out of the inferiority complex that had afflicted its China policy since the 1962 border war. As India becomes aware of its own increasing weight in the world and relearns the art of balance of power, it has no reason to believe Chinese are ten foot tall and would always get the better of us. As two rising powers, India and China are bound to step on each other’s toes. As neighbours and two of the world’s largest economies, they would also increasingly work together.

So for India and China the trick is to find the right balance between competition and cooperation and acknowledge each other’s core national interests. In organising the Bay of Bengal exercises and signalling its readiness to play hard ball on China, New Delhi has put out a simple message — it will not play second fiddle to Beijing in Asia. That India will contest the construction of a Sino-centric Asian order does not in any way imply becoming a junior partner to the US. The current confusion in the domestic debate on the policies towards the US and China stems from the refusal to see India’s new role as the “swing state” that can tilt the global balance of power. The moment we see India as a great power on the make, the contours of New Delhi’s self-confident realpolitik comes into bold relief.