The ninth nuclear horseman

The US confronted the North Koreans with intelligence information about the latter’s clandestine nuclear programme. But that this may have reached the levels of weaponisation apparently came as a surprise to the Americans. This monumental intelligence failure to detect the programme as it proceeded to a level of producing weapons flies in the face of the non-proliferation regimes strengthened in the last decade. It is ironical that while the US was totally focused on its desire for war against Iraq, the country at the other end of the so-called ‘axis of evil’ was continuing to make nuclear bombs and building/exporting nuclear-capable ballistic missiles!

North Korea was suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapon programme in the early 1990s in spite of its obligations as a non-nuclear member of the NPT. In 1994 it gave a legally valid notice of withdrawal from the Treaty. But it agreed to stop its programme in lieu of a gift of two nuclear power reactors and economic assistance under a landmark agreement with the US. This policy of rewarding nuclear proliferation by treaty violators obviously has not worked.

The earlier programme, expected to have produced material for between one to three weapons, was based on plutonium extracted from nuclear waste. The current claim rests on acquiring highly enriched uranium. Both routes are now available to North Korea which has operational nuclear-capable ballistic missiles of ranges of 1,500 km and more. In fact, it has supplied such missiles (the Nodong) to Pakistan, and possibly other countries. This was the type of missile which was being flouted by Pakistan as the Ghauri, fired from Jhelum in Punjab in 1998, and again later on, including during the military confrontation this year when General Musharraf held out nuclear threats. A ship carrying material and sub-systems for ballistic missiles for Pakistan under false documents had been impounded in the Indian port of Kandla in 1996.

Uranium enrichment technology is available with very few countries. Pakistan itself had taken nearly two decades to assemble the wherewithal to get a workable enrichment facility. It was recently reported to have acquired 47 tons of the special material for the centrifuge from the UK. Thus the question of sources from which North Korea would have obtained such technology and materials should be of global concern. It may be recalled that Iraq earlier had acquired missile and nuclear technologies from western countries. Given the reality of the continuing social and economic crises of North Korea it is reasonable to assume that it would not be able to produce weapon-grade uranium in the comparatively short period of about six to eight years without external assistance. And the probability is very high that such assistance came from Pakistan, possibly as a quid pro quo for North Korean supply of battle-ready ballistic missiles.

What does a nuclear North Korea mean for the region and the world? Firstly, the US would find it extremely difficult to use force against North Korea which maintains a massive conventional military force. South Korea’s capital is within its artillery range. A possible Korean War with nuclear weapons is the last thing the US would want. While attempts would no doubt be made to roll back its programme with incentives of massive economic aid etc, chances are that this process would be lengthy and full of uncertainties. North Korea’s bargaining power has grown immensely with the possession of nuclear weapons. In addition it would acquire immunity from any military attack. The question will be whether it would like to bargain away this capability, or simply negotiate with the strength and knowledge that the West in general and South Korea and Japan in particular, could not but maintain better relations with it now.

Secondly, re-unification of the Koreas, difficult at the best of times, would now appear to have receded into a very distant future. At the same time, Japan may well have second thoughts about its security now that one more nuclear weapon state is added to the existing three in the region. The overwhelming national sentiment against nuclear weapons could finally give way to pragmatic measures for nuclear defence. At the minimum, Japan would intensify its search for missile defences along with a deeper commitment to extended deterrence by the US. This, in turn, would make China more nervous. In fact, the pressures for deployment of missile defence systems in Asia would only increase. This would not necessarily create greater stability.

Clandestine acquisition of nuclear weapons by an NPT non-nuclear member, otherwise a weak state, poses the severest challenge to the Bush Doctrine of pre-emptive use of superior military force and counter-proliferation. In the overall context, nuclear non-proliferation has received a major blow which it may find it difficult to survive. In the absence of any move toward disarmament, North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons in violation of treaty obligations is likely to increase the incentives for other countries to acquire such weapons increasing the prospects of further proliferation.