The N-Team

The Quiet Adviser
Shyam Saran, PM’s Special Envoy
He quietly stepped aside to make way for Shiv Shankar Menon but he played a very important role in the background, advising the PM, the bigger picture ever in mind. It was he who pointed out the need for a double guarantee on fuel assurances in the agreement, saying the strategic fuel reserve had to be immune from any US right of return. His continuous advice was that this was an agreement for the next two decades and hence, must be negotiated thoroughly as there would be no chance to reopen it again. He also kept the channel with other NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) countries going, keeping the friendly countries posted with developments and visiting the ‘‘fence sitter’’ countries regularly so that the next stage was made easier. His little-publicised second-track diplomacy has won India support from more NSG members, adding to the pressure to complete the deal.

The Devil’s Advocate
Anil Kakodkar,Chief of the Department of Atomic Energy
Always sceptical of the progress in the agreement, he kept the negotiators on their toes. Without his clearance, no agreement could have been legitimised. His scepticism did pay off as the final draft is a detailed document leaving little scope for misunderstanding. That his attitude did not mean he was against the N-deal is reflected in the fact that he first proposed the possibility of setting up a dedicated facility for spent fuel. His representative conveyed that this was possible, which is what swung the right to reprocess for India in the end.
On Friday after the completion of the bilateral agreement was announced, Kakodkar had this to say: ‘‘What I said earlier in the past was the national position. What I am saying now is the national position and what we have got is consistent with our national position. So I have no reason to be unhappy.’’

The Either/Or Man
Shiv Shankar Menon,Foreign Secretary
He joined the talks at a later stage. His earlier stint with DAE gave him huge credibility with the scientists and he used that effectively to balance views. It was particularly useful in the ‘‘last one hour’’ when the Indian side was going through the final draft of the agreement in Washington. It was Menon, who spent that hour explaining and convincing DAE head Anil Kakodkar on all aspects of the agreement. This was vital as Kakodkar had not participated in the talks, but he held the veto that could have rendered all the effort futile. Fellow negotiators call Menon the ‘‘either/or man’’ as he always gave two options for a solution.
He is credited with backing the NSG model on safeguards, which talks of bilateral consultation in case IAEA expresses inability to carry out inspections. This was more suited than allowing US inspectors to come in, something that the PM had made it clear was unacceptable. Something new for officials was his penchant to send ideas through SMS to fellow negotiators while they did technical talks outside Delhi.

Everyman’s Confidant
S Jaishankar, Indian Ambassador to Singapore
Known as the man for all seasons, he was everyone’s confidant. Many call him the author of the agreement, as it was his team that prepared drafts and framed the language. He is famous for his little chats in the negotiating room with US officials, carrying messages and putting ideas in the minds of the principals (heads of delegation). His high credibility with all participants, especially with the opposite camp, made him almost ‘‘indispensable’’ as he was asked to head technical negotiations despite being transferred out of the MEA’s US division. Always the ‘‘solutions man’’, Jaishankar used his credibility quotient well on the reprocessing question. It was only after he made it clear to the Americans that the deal wouldn’t work without the right to reprocess that the US finally realised the issue was a genuine ‘‘deal-breaker’’. He headed the technical talks in South Africa and London that precisely drove home this point.

The Foreign Hands
Santosh Jha (MEA) & D B Venkatesh Varma (PMO)
The two director-level IFS officials, who worked closely with Jaishankar to draw up the Indian drafts of the agreement, deal with the finer technical points and come up with suitable language. While Jha was everyone’s reference point on US laws, policies and precedents, Varma was the language expert.
The duo are credited for framing the ‘‘non-hindrance’’ clause (an explicit US commitment to not come in the way of the Indian strategic agreement) in the agreement in a manner that the US ultimately accepted it.
Pitted against professional American lawyers in the negotiating team, the two held their own providing effective back-up support to the top negotiators.

The Techie
R B Grover, Department of Atomic Energy
As DAE representative in the technical talks, he held the veto in Kakodkar’s absence on any point in the agreement. His role was constructive in getting several other technical issues resolved quickly, leaving the few big issues like reprocessing to be handled at the top level. It was through him that Kakodkar conveyed the idea of building a dedicated facility for storing foreign-origin spent fuel.

The Catalyst
Condoleezza Rice,Secretary of State
Unlike in previous negotiations as well as during the time the US Congress was debating the Hyde Act (or the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act), Rice was not too actively involved in the 123 talks. However, she prodded and pushed the naysayers and non-proliferation experts in the State Department to see reason in working out the deal. Sources say she played a very critical role in keeping the back channel alive with the US Congress on the issue, keeping in mind the up and down vote on the agreement. Her role will get more important as the agreement reaches closer to the vote. Her role in swinging the NSG to support the agreement will also be vital.

The Final Facilitator
Stephen Hadley, NSA
Just like the March 2 Separation Plan, he played the ‘‘clinching role’’ from an Indian perspective in the 123 talks.
It was to him that US President George W Bush turned when Prime Minister Manmohan Singh took up the two contentious issues of reprocessing consent and fuel supplies guarantee on the margins of the G-8. Hadley had a separate meeting with Narayanan and then followed it up with hectic internal meetings in Washington to ensure the deal is saved.
Hadley carried the ‘‘tough message’’ to the State Department.

The Driving Force
Nicholas Burns,Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
As Menon’s counterpart, Burns was tasked to complete the 123 agreement. Credit must go to him for injecting a sense of urgency in the Indian camp during the early days of the negotiation. Sources say he was the one who kept pressing the ‘‘start button’’ on the talks, which had almost went on the backburner after the Hyde Act was passed.
However, his assumption that this would be an easy agreement to negotiate as the template was ready according to US law proved wrong. India forced a protracted negotiation on every aspect of the agreement, frustrating him on several occasions, especially the reprocessing issue. His last offer that US could commit to discuss reprocessing at a later date did not wash with New Delhi. Despite this, his team was forthcoming to resolve other issues including the flexibility to accept the ‘‘non-hindrance’’ clause. In the final hours, his role was eclipsed by directives from Hadley & Co.

The Guide
Richard Stratford,Director of Nuclear Energy, Safety and Security in State Department
He headed the 123 technical negotiations on the US side. A veteran of nearly 35 such agreements and currently involved in talks with Russia, he played an important role in showing India the way even though he did not have the mandate to take a call on sensitive issues.
Richard Stratford would very often discuss ideas on reprocessing rights and fuel supplies guarantee and while he was not empowered to make these decisions, he would go ahead and tell India what was workable with Washington.
Supported by a battery of lawyers in his team, Stratford always had a response ready for India. And that was responsible for making every round fruitful in some way or the other.

The Mediator
David Mulford,US Ambassador to India
As Washington’s interface with New Delhi, Mulford did the perfect job of providing feedback and keeping hopes alive in both camps. A political appointee, he is said to have played a quiet role in raising the matter to a political level, conceding to the Indian argument that Bush would have to be involved to resolve the two issues that were holding up the N-deal. His participation in the last round of talks at Washington was vital in ensuring that the State Department mandarins didn’t get in the way despite Bush’s political direction to have the deal finalised. The initiative at arranging the telephone conversation between Manmohan Singh and Bush before the high-powered Indian team left for Washington was Mulford’s high point in the final hours.

The Reference Point
Ashley Tellis, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
His expertise on India as well as nuclear issues was the perfect cocktail to make him a reference point for State Department. His active involvement in the Separation Plan discussions made him equally important for the 123 talks too.
It was he who finally convinced the Americans and corrected the misimpression that India was using the reprocessing issue as a negotiating tactic. Even after the Bush-Singh pull aside at Heiligendamm, many in the State Department were not convinced. Jaishankar’s visit to Carnegie for a lecture in the last week of June proved useful in getting Tellis to pass on the unequivocal message to the State Department that India would walk out of the deal if there was no consent to reprocessing.

India’s Voice
Geoffery Pyatt, Former Charge D’Affaires,US Embassy
He moved out of India the day the two sides sealed the deal in Washington. But his role in the backroom cannot go unnoticed. As political counsellor and then CDA, he nurtured the deal from its inception.
And though his role diminished towards the end, he was the constant Indian voice in the US camp lobbying hard for a compromise. His emphasis was on the bigger picture that the India-US relationship hinged on the n-deal and a failure would deliver a serious setback on all fronts.
Now as US pointman in Vienna, his role will be important in tying up India-specific fuel assurances with the help of IAEA.