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This is an archive article published on October 6, 2004

The inscrutable bamboo curtain

Very little is being made public about the third round of the Special Representative-level talks held recently in New Delhi. Understandably,...

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Very little is being made public about the third round of the Special Representative-level talks held recently in New Delhi. Understandably, the contents of the talks have been kept under wraps by both the sides—the decision not to hurry through with an agreement was quite clear. Even prior to the talks, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister for South Asia Shen Guofeng had cautioned mediapersons that as the two sides proceed deeper into the issue, there will be more problems.

India’s new interlocutor, J N Dixit, provided the spin that the issue must have a political solution, but an agreement at any cost and compromise are not the ends that are sought. The new argument of some Indian opinion makers is that we must move away from the ‘‘peasant mentality’’ of holding on to territory and instead talk about the metropolitan culture of focusing on trade and economic relations with China. In this connection, China’s border-negotiating tactics with three Central Asian states are worth understanding.

China’s official mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, recently cautioned that the outcome of the border negotiations depended on larger political, diplomatic and strategic dimensions. The article contested what it called ‘‘India’s assertive nationalist aspirations’’, a euphemism for India’s dominance in South Asia, modernisation of the Indian Navy perceived to control the Indian Ocean, and India’s ‘‘Look East’’ policy. Chinese neither talk about open borders nor economic benefits of it. In fact, the Chinese showed misgivings about increased activity along the Indo-Tibetan frontier. They have been, however, pushing for border trade along Yatung for the obvious reasons of getting access to India’s vulnerable east.

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China’s position of not accepting the McMahon Line by name is understandable since the matter impinges upon its sovereignty over Tibet. Interestingly, Chinese pre-positioning points are being articulated through a recent article by Cheng Ruisheng, published in Chinese Foreign Ministry-sponsored journal International Studies. Cheng, a former ambassador to India and currently an Adviser to the Chinese Foreign Ministry, states the following non-negotiable positions: (a) In the eastern sector, India illegally occupies 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory; (b) In the western sector, India illegally claims 33,000 sq km of Chinese territory; (c) In the middle sector, India similarly occupies 2,000 sq km of Chinese territory; (d) The 1962 war was a Chinese counter-attack in self-defence.

The Chinese are masters at obfuscation. In boundary negotiations with the Soviet Union, China presented three obstacles and insisted to Moscow that these be sorted out first before any meaningful progress could be made. What are the issues which China might portray as main obstacles for border negotiations with India?

Firstly, it is quite clear that the Chinese are going to raise the issue of the presence of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan followers in India. Having obtained India’s endorsement of Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China, Beijing is now building up a case that the Dalai Lama and his establishment in India are sending saboteurs and terrorists into Tibet. Chinese assert that the Dalai Lama is acting on the advice of the US and India. The Chinese intention is to compel New Delhi to dismantle the in-exile Tibetan Government in Dharamsala and eventually expel the Dalai Lama from India. Secondly, the Chinese official position remains that Sikkim is a historical issue between India and China and ‘‘hopes’’ it will be resolved as bilateral relations improve. Interestingly, the Chinese have not yet raised the border issue in the Sikkim portion, which they might bring up. It is quite clear that the recognition of Sikkim as part of India will depend on the demarcation of this boundary to the satisfaction of the Chinese. Similarly, the trade agreement between Sikkim and Tibet is also without prejudice to the status of Sikkim.

Thirdly, China may eventually also raise the question of the Indo-Bhutanese Treaty on Bhutan’s Defence and Foreign Relations. The Chinese have been asking the Bhutanese to get rid of Indian military presence on their soil in order to gain full diplomatic recognition by China. These issues qualify for China’s perception of India’s assertive nationalism and, hence, are obstacles for border settlement.

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A perception has gained currency in India that China has not agreed to border trade in Ladakh because the Line of Actual Control (LAC) has not been demarcated there. The LAC has not been demarcated anywhere, yet there are two other border trading points. In reality, China recognises Kashmir as disputed territory. The Chinese have been deliberately avoiding official dealings with India in Jammu and Kashmir because they could be interpreted as China’s acceptance of Indian sovereignty of Indian side of Kashmir. This was the precise reason given by the Chinese when the Commander of Lanzhou Military Region backed out from a visit to Leh, although this visit was agreed upon under the 1996 CBMs. In recent years, Pakistan has been dissuading the Chinese against venturing into any kind of major economic, transport projects with India involving Ladakh. Chinese have also been lukewarm about India’s suggestion of an oil pipeline through the Xinjiang-Ladakh corridor.

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