Measured in fatalities and injuries, the worst terrorist attacks have been in New York, Al-Qataniyah (Iraq), Al-Adnaniyah (Iraq), Abadan, Beslan, Bombay (1993), Nairobi, Dar es Saalam, Beirut, Ben Talha (Algeria), Ami Moussa (Algeria), Mecca, Sidi Moussa (Algeria), Hais Rais (Algeria), Kuta, Baghdad, Mumbai (2006), Moscow, Oklahoma, Sophia, Anuradhapura, Karachi, Manila, Colombo, Kandahar and so on. Within India, in addition to Mumbai, we have Coimbatore, Srinagar, Delhi, Jammu, Varanasi, Malegaon, Hyderabad, Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad, not to mention Surat. Given terrorist objectives, attacks work when there is a concentration of people. The Akshardham temple, Sankatmochan Mandir (Varanasi) and Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) follow the same logic. Barring planes and trains, terrorism is an urban phenomenon. Naxalite violence is somewhat different. This is Carlos Marighella in his1969 Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla: “The government has no alternative except to intensify its repression. The police networks, house searches, the arrest of suspects and innocent persons, and the closing off of streets make life in the city unbearable.” There are reasons why cities evolved, all centred around positive externalities — transport, other infrastructure and services, security and protection, larger markets, economies of scale and scope in production and distribution, labour markets.After the recent round of attacks, there will be discussions on cross-border effects, ineffectiveness of intelligence, under-manning of police, the proposed federal counter-terrorism agency and ineffectiveness of the judicial system. In its attempt to be fair to the accused, the judicial system imposes collateral damage on the innocent. Why should it be different when the accused are terrorists? These points are extremely important. However, let’s focus on the urban aspect: any urban Indian resident will now be exposed to police barricades and metal detectors. No bombs have ever been identified through metal detectors, and no terrorists have ever been caught through barricades. We will be told gathering preventive intelligence in cities is impossible. Every individual is anonymous. Terrorists have imbibed Mao Zedong’s adage to guerrillas: they disappear like fish in the sea. But that’s not really true. An individual is anonymous only if one looks at a city as a unified urban agglomeration. No city is like that. The residential areas of every city are nothing but modernised villages, connected to each other through networks of the kind that made cities evolve. Am I, however, anonymous to the centralised police system? I probably am, because no one remembers police verification at the time of passport-issuance. Am I anonymous to the local police station? I probably am, because data collected at the time of passport-issuance has not percolated through to local police.I am probably even anonymous to my neighbours, because no one has time for others. But that doesn’t mean I am anonymous within my residential community. Residents’ welfare association, private security guards employed by them, cable-TV provider, internet provider, newspaper vendor, local taxi stand, neighbourhood shop, home-delivery food outlets, electrician, plumber, parking attendant at shopping centre, these are all instances of people who know who I am. It is impossible to exist without leaving a trail and I am not anonymous vis-à-vis them. While the precise list may vary from one kind of residential area to another, such facilitatory networks generate enough information. It is just that this isn’t factored into intelligence-gathering. If we expect police or other centralised counter-intelligence bodies to gather preventive intelligence, it simply won’t work. We will only have knee-jerk reactions of barricades and metal-detectors. The state of high-alert will pass and we will have another terrorist attack. There is a Model Police Act now, which has an explicit provision for bringing in community-level organisations. However, few states have implemented that particular provision. In a similar vein, labour market and consumption networks also generate enough information. Why isn’t this gathered and processed? This is more than the knee-jerk idea of requiring every bicycle-purchaser to provide identity cards. Incidentally, no identity card seems to be required for purchasing explosives. There is a broader issue of the unorganised nature of many commercial transactions. In a developing country that’s inevitable. But while small may be beautiful, beauty has nothing to do with business. Large and organised, not government-induced smallness, is good for business. It is also good for security.What identity cards are bicycle-purchasers going to produce? Forget counterfeit versions of identity cards. Genuine ones like ration cards and driving licences can be obtained through agents for payment of fees. In other words, government-delivered systems of such cards are ridden with corruption and don’t help the cause of security. What happened to the biometric national identity card that now goes by the name of multi-purpose national identity card (MNIC)? It started in 2002 under the NDA, was mentioned by Abdul Kalam in his August 15, 2006 speech and has been quietly continued by the UPA since July 2004, with pilot projects in 20 sub-districts. Most pilots are in border regions; the only exceptions are Goa, Delhi, Andhra, Puducherry and Tamil Nadu, of which, only Delhi and Goa are urban in any sense. Among other things, MNIC will also link databases connected with admissions in educational institutes, health/medical services, ticket booking, SC/ST/OBC status, old-age pensions/disability, birth/marriage/death, property transactions, PDS, NREGA and the financial sector. In principle, this inter-connectivity should enable double-checks and reduce fraud.But there are questions. Why is the government so quiet about the MNIC? This is so hush-hush that the website is still under construction, after four years. If cities are the focus of terrorism, why are Goa and Delhi the only urban centres for pilots? Implementation should be easier in urban India. For instance, in Murshidabad, according to reports, the pilot couldn’t verify 90 per cent of the population. Given government track records, why isn’t one outsourcing part of the identification function, including the use of communities? PAN cards never took off until their issuance was partly outsourced. Rather oddly, India provides IT services to the rest of the world and this encompasses security too. But we don’t use that skill and expertise at home. We also need another POTA — Prevention of Torpid Attitude.The writer is a noted economist express@expressindia.com
