The day after the Bush dictum

There is also the assessment that the US stands isolated which may ultimately affect its influence as a superpower. Both these assessments are valid only in the short-term. The prospects are of the US remaining an effectively dominant force, with other nations making their adjustments.

The timeframe for the present dichotomy between western Europe and the US would be dependent on the length of the war. If it is short, the world will soon close ranks behind President Bush. If there is longer-term conflict, the controversies will simmer but the prospects of Pax America emerging unscathed should not be in doubt.

Leaving aside the international implications of such a war, it would be pertinent to take note of Indian perceptions of the developing situation, the implications of the military action against Iraq for Indian interests, and the lines on which India is reacting to the crisis.

Perceptions of the impending war are subject to a complicated dichotomy. Hussein and his government have had a record of friendly and cooperative relations with India. The Baath Party regime under him is perceived by large sections of Indian public opinion as a secular, modern state. Iraq has been one of the very few Islamic nations which have supported India on J&K. Iraq is also a major supplier of oil and energy resources to India and has been a market for Indian technology and investments.

Till the Gulf War, a large numbers of Indians lived in Iraq, enhancing India’s foreign exchange earnings. So there is a certain emotional sympathy and support for Saddam Hussein in this country.

At the same time, his repressive activities against his own citizens and elsewhere over the last decade and more, have affected his credibility. Even more pertinent is the fact that despite Saddam Hussein’s disclaimers, there is sufficient evidence that he does have weapons of mass destruction.

His compliance of the stipulations of the UN Security Council resolutions has been selective, gradual and always subject to accelerated pressure. India also feels that he does not seem to be concerned about the enormous sufferings the Iraqis have undergone since the Gulf War and which they are likely to undergo once US military operations take place.

The likelihood is not of a short surgical or conclusive military operation but a prolonged conflict in which ordinary Iraqis would suffer. The military prospects are fraught with dangerous uncertainties. India, therefore, has a complex choice of either standing by Saddam Hussein, who has been a friend, or joining the mainstream of international action against him for the undoubtedly negative role he has played in de-stabilising our region over the last two decades.

What are the implications of this war that have a direct bearing on India? It will certainly disrupt energy supplies to India for some time which would negatively impact on all sectors of the economy.

There may not be a major disruption of work and earnings of Indians living in the Gulf except those based in Iraq. But the ripple effect of critical responses from public opinion in Arab countries, particularly in the countries of the Gulf, will create a tense situation for the large Indian community resident in the region.

The impending change of regime in Iraq necessitates India being in a position to establish contacts with the new regime, to be able to revive both political and economic relations with the country. This necessity has been acknowledged, both by the Indian government and public opinion.

But, most important of all, is the strategic and security implications of a successful military operation by the US against Iraq for India. One must expect a high level resentment among Islamic countries neighbouring India against the US, resulting in higher levels of international terrorist activity because the networks led by Al Qaeda are still operating.

This could subject J&K to higher levels of terrorist attacks. It is to be noted that the ‘‘national security objectives’’ document issued by the White House in September 2002 clearly states that the US reserves its right to political and military intervention to meet three objectives: Elimination of terrorism, elimination of weapons of mass destruction and avoidance of military confrontation due to violations of human rights.

It is not illogical to speculate that given the continuation of cross-border terrorist acts in J&K, and the possession of nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan, the US could generate direct military and political pressure on India and Pakistan.

While the pressure on Pakistan could only be on the issue of terrorism, pressure on India would be to get it to agree on a compromise over Kashmir, a compromise which could be detrimental to Indian interests.

But it should also be pointed out that by being supportive of the US position on Iraq, India would ensure its political and economic interests, in both regional and global terms. While it is true that the implications in terms of international law and the restructuring of an international order based on the unilateralism of a superior force would be negative, India has to be realistic.

And the only realistic position for India is to convey to the US that it generally understands the logic of US policies but, as a friend, it must point out the macro-level institutional, political and economic consequences of unbridled unilateralism.

It must also be conveyed unequivocally that if, consequent to the Iraqi operation, the US or any other country takes initiatives which are detrimental to its interests, India would firmly resist such initiatives.