
It is transparently clear why Pakistan8217;s Foreign Minister is making a sudden, unscheduled visit to China. Beijing appears like the last refuge in the gathering storm of international criticism of Pakis-tan8217;s incursions over the LoC. That is obvious. Until recently a Washington trip would have been likely and while that may still be on the itinerary, Beijing is more immediately important for Islamabad for a clutch of reasons.
Unlike the US or Russia, China has not yet explicitly found fault with Pakistan and this may encourage Sartaj Aziz to believe that at least one major power can be prevailed upon to stay neutral. Another possibility is that with Jaswant Singh himself scheduled shortly to visit Beijing, Aziz has seized the opportunity to get in the first word on Kargil. The intention will not be so much to win Beijing over by presenting new facts.
There are none and by now the Chinese cannot be in any doubt about the true nature of the Kargil conflict. Aziz8217;s job can only be to persuade Beijing to helpIslamabad save face. How? China8217;s experience with its own border disputes in the past will make it cautious about lending credibility to Islamabad8217;s fudge about the LoC not being clearly demarcated and that the infiltrators are acting without the aid of Pakistan8217;s army.
Whether or not they welcome the task of pulling Islamabad8217;s chestnuts out of the fire, China8217;s leaders are bound to be cordial to an old friend which has in its time been a useful counterweight to India. Beijing will also be appreciative of the recognition accorded to its own status in the Asian region by the fact that the foreign ministers of two South Asian countries engaged in a border war are calling one after the other.
But however much this might look like an opportunity to mediate in the subcontinent, Beijing should not and probably will not give in to that temptation and make a departure from the correct position it has adopted on Kargil and on Kashmir generally, that they are bilateral issues between India and Pakistan. True, inthe immediate aftermath of Pokharan-II and the careless rhetoric of Indian leaders, Beijing did briefly move towards setting itself up together with the US and other western powers as the arbiter of South Asian affairs.
But things have changed since then. For one, although it is not all sweetness and light again between India and China, bitterness is being put aside and an effort is being made to rebuild what both capitals recognise is an important relationship. Second, Chinese foreign policy in Asia which for decades has been aimed at building confidence about its intentions is even more relevant in the current international situation.
Nor can China be blind to the fact that the mix of Islamic fundamentalism and sophisticated weapons with which Pakistan tries to further its own interests is a threat to peace and stability not only in Central Asia where China has important political and economic interests but nearer home in its own south-western region. At the same time it cannot abandon a valuable friendin its hour of need. So what Islamabad8217;s China card can win for it, at best, is private admonishment followed by assurances that Beijing will try diplomatically to make its exit from Kargil a little less painful.