The battle for peace

Lately, there has been a spate of seminars on Kashmir. No cut-and-dried formula has emerged because the participants at seminars have made more efforts to touch as many points as possible than arrive at a consensus. Indians and the Pakistanis, however liberal, more or less toe their government line. The Kashmiris generally confine themselves to listing “the excesses” committed in the state and seldom apply their mind to any specific proposal.

For the past few months, another suggestion which is gaining attention, is that of a tripartite conference. A laudable proposal, but it is bound tofail if the ground is not prepared for it. No doubt, Islamabad is keen on having a tripartite conference. But it will serve no purpose if some private understanding is not reached on major differences. In its absence, talks will break down on the very first day. Probably, Islamabad has a feeling that it could be left out of the process. The unilateral ceasefire seems to have created this impression. But this is not true. India has always tried to engage Pakistan. As far back as 1964, when Jawaharlal Nehru sent Sheikh Abdullah to Pakistan, India’s intention was clear. It did not wantto bypass Islamabad.

In his book Ayub Khan, the former Pakistan Information Secretary Altaf Guhar, who died a few days ago, has recorded the conversation between the Sheikh and Ayub. Says Guhar: "Ayub said that he was getting a little fed up with a variety of solutions that were on offer and told Sheikh Abdullah to forget about Pakistan and come to any settlement he wanted with India. A little taken aback, Sheikh Abdullah exclaimed that there could be no settlement without Pakistan."

This holds just as good today as it did then. India has said so in the Shimla Agreement by recording that a "final settlement" on Kashmir was yet to take place. Vajpayee initiated a process at Lahore to pursue the matter. Even behind-the-scenes parleys through non-officials have sought to arrive at some basic understanding. In fact, former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has gone on record as saying that the efforts were fructifying. The military leadership has to realise that there will be confusion if all the three points, New Delhi, Islamabad and Srinagar, are touched at the same time. Any two can begin the process and the third can join later. Pakistan has itself suggested more than once that it does not mind New Delhi and Kashmir leaders starting a dialogue.

The real problem is Musharraf or, for that matter, the military. They do not want a settlement with India because their raison d’etre is based on stoking the fires of differences. Kashmir is their cat’s paw, which they use to keep India on tenterhooks. Cross-border militancy is one method, Kargil was a bigger operation with the same purpose in view. But Musharraf and his military junta also know that India can absorb all this, not only because it has more resources but also because it has a firmer belief in settling the Kashmir issue peacefully. Yet Islamabad has used violence, again and again, to solve the problem.

At Tashkent, following the 1965 war, Pakistan promised not to resort to arms to settle disputes with New Delhi. At Shimla again, Islamabad gave anundertaking not to alter the Line of Control (LoC) "unilaterally, irrespective of mutual differences and legal interpretations". Still it is a fact that Pakistan has trained, armed and sheltered those who came from the Valley. Islamabad also encouraged foreign mercenaries from Afghanistan and beyond to fight in Kashmir. Before Musharraf, it was a proxy war; now it is jihad. How can Kashmir or any problem between India and Pakistan be settled when the present rulers at Islamabad are imbued with such motives?

The entire blame cannot, however, lie at the door of Islamabad. Where India has gone wrong is that it has tended to act as an adversary. It has thrived on Pakistan’s troubles. The hawks sitting in our foreign office — they are invariably accommodated after retirement — have seldom tried to learn how to adjust and live with an intransigent neighbour. Even in ordinary matters like newspapers and books, New Delhi has only copied Islamabad. Why does India not unilaterally lift the ban?

I recall what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Pakistan’s prime minister, told me after the Shimla Agreement. He was demanding the release of 90,000 war prisoners whom India had captured during the 1972 Bangladesh war. India’s argument was that it could not do this without the approval of Dhaka, which was opposed to their release till Pakistan recognised Bangladesh. "Do you want another Ayub or Yahya in Pakistan?" Bhutto asked. "If not, why don’t you help me?" Later at a press conference in Rawalpindi he said that India had never utilised opportunities for friendship in the past. The Shimla Agreement, according to him, was the last one: "I may not stay long but I do not think that Pakistan and India would ever be friends if India did not wake up to the chance now."

Coming to the present, New Delhi can take credit for building international pressure against Musharraf on Kargil. It can also take credit for winning over world opinion. Indeed, Islamabad stands isolated. But if such situations remain static for long, the law of diminishing returns will come into play. New Delhi has to talk to Islamabad, sooner or later. Let SAARC be activated. A SAARC summit has been pending for a long time. India should take the initiative in fixing the date. Once again Vajpayee will rise in people’s estimate, as he did after the Lahore initiative.

By responding to the ceasefire, Musharraf can make good his words: “I am willing to talk to India at any level at any time and at any place.”

The real problem is Musharraf and the military. They do not want a settlement. Kashmir is their cat’s paw, which they use to keep India on tenterhooks