Talking terms

After some rather sharp pre-dialogue exchanges, the process of composite dialogue to normalise bilateral relations between Pakistan and India appears to be on track despite the change of government in New Delhi. Except for the meetings on restarting the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus travel, it was the meeting on nuclear CBMs (confidence building measures) — scheduled to take place in the third week of May — that had to be postponed. This became necessary because the Manmohan Singh government was still in the process of being formed. It is good that the rescheduling has been given the priority it deserved so that lost time could be made up in the weeks that lead up to the foreign ministers’ meet in August.

But we also need to be pragmatic and not start killing the process by overly unrealistic expectations. India-Pakistan dialogue has a long history — almost as long as the tensions and conflicts that have marked interaction between the subcontinental neighbours. What we tend to forget is the enormous quantum of agreements and confidence building measures that have already been agreed to by both sides over the decades. It is in this context that both nations need to bear in mind the reality that the greater the movement toward normal relations, the greater the scope for arriving at mutually agreed solutions to outstanding issues and disputes. What has dogged bilateral relations is as much a lack of trust — or rather the existence of a near pervasive mistrust — as the reality of differences and disputes.

For example, the mere mention of the 1972 Simla Agreement as the basis of bilateral relations seems to have raised objections across the border. But the agreement committed both sides to meet and discuss the modalities and arrangements for the establishment of a durable peace and normalisation of relations, including a final settlement of Jammu and Kashmir. It appears that Pakistan was either unwilling or unprepared to discuss the J&K issue. It was only after militancy assumed serious proportions in the state in the ’90s that Islamabad discovered that Kashmir was the “core issue” and must be resolved first before any normalisation can be envisaged. In the meanwhile, the problem is that both sides now have extremely limited negotiating space to even move toward a solution of outstanding issues, especially those related to J&K. Common sense would tell us that any negotiating space would require substantive mutual trust and the reshaping of bilateral relations across the board rather than holding them hostage to a single issue, however important it is perceived by one side or the other. Let both countries then steer ahead in this process of normalisation through dialogue — with hope, commitment and good sense.