Talking points, sticky issues

Taking off from the 1999 MOU, then, what are the central issues that we need to focus on? The fundamental point is that nuclear risks are tied to three broad categories: One, armed conflict ranging from a war through terror triggering a limited or full-scale war, in turn escalating to nuclear weapons. Two, accidents or miscalculations leading to the use of nuclear weapons. Three, the state losing, willingly or otherwise, its control over nuclear weapons and weapon-making capacity through transfer to unauthorised persons and/or states for political, economic or ideological reasons.

It is obvious that if the possibility of use of nuclear weapons is to be minimised, then the risk of armed conflict across its full spectrum must be drastically reduced if not eliminated. At one level this requires stable and trustworthy, if not friendly, relations between Pakistan and India. History does not make for such confidence. Nor is the posture of making the Kashmir solution — without the slightest idea of what such a solution acceptable to both sides might be — the touchstone of future relations helpful. Given the situation as it has evolved since the mid-’80s, eliminating terrorism must form the basic, if not the first, step in reducing nuclear dangers. The suicidal attacks on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, clearly indicate that as long as terrorist strikes continue there could always be situations which demand escalation to conventional military conflict with all its attendant complexities. And democracies would be under greater pressures in these circumstances. Pakistan needs to take a lesson from its strategic ally, China, which stopped its 20-year old support to Naga insurgency within months of India’s nuclear test of 1974.

At the same time, serious thought needs to be given to the issue of conventional war. Fundamentally, nuclear weapons with both countries have created a sort of strategic stability — or stalemate — in the employment of military force against each other beyond limited, discrete calibrated strikes. The classical concept of occupation of valuable territory by force or the destruction of the adversary’s military power is not realistic without seriously risking nuclear escalation. But there may be temptation to mount a surprise offensive or a superior strategy might suddenly drop the plum of victory in one’s hand by paralysing the adversary through “shock and awe”. This was the Pakistani assumption for Kargil. The risks are obvious.

Prudence would suggest that if a stalemate is almost inevitable unless we risk escalation, why not reduce the risks of sudden sharp offensive? In other words, it is time the two countries moved toward mutually negotiated conventional arms control to reduce the prospects of any substantive advantage through conventional military offensive. Many models, like the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, exist. The process would no doubt take a long time and may still not be an adequate guarantee against conventional war. Success in this direction would lead to mutual security at lower costs for both as long as the capability for adequate conventional punitive action is not jettisoned. More important, the process itself would help to reduce threat perceptions and also hold out a promise of stability in relations that is the bedrock of nuclear risk reduction.

It is important to note that the Pakistan government’s “commitments” for nuclear risk reduction, for whatever they are worth, end if nuclear weapons are not under its control. The record of nuclear proliferation from Pakistan raises the basic question about the ability and willingness of its government to limit the availability of nuclear weapons to within its own strict control. The US and much of the international community has been deeply concerned about the security of Pakistani nuclear weapons and the risk of their falling into the hands of radical Islamists. Nuclear proliferation from Pakistan has taken place at an unprecedented scale to a number of countries and possibly to Al-Qaeda as well. President Musharraf’s statements and claims that a few individuals in its nuclear establishment led by A.Q. Khan — now granted a presidential pardon — had indulged in such proliferation provides no confidence that more has not happened in the past, or will not happen again.

If we are to be serious about reducing nuclear risks, it is vital that the issue of control and transfer of nuclear weapons or material to recipients not authorised to receive them legally must be placed on the agenda of the May dialogue. Even if we were to accept the posture taken by Islamabad, and endorsed by Washington for other reasons, the issue of government responsibility in such matters cannot be wished away. What is required is a bilateral/multilateral agreement committing the country to ensure foolproof and continuing control over its nuclear weapons.