The WAR that the US military has launched in Iraq isn’t the kind it has been told by Colin Powell and his peers that it should be ready to fight.
Since the American policy of gradual ‘‘escalation’’ of military force ended in failure in Vietnam, a generation has been shaped by the notion that when the nation goes to war, it must use its power to decisively defeat enemies. But the opening phase of the Second Gulf War has been marked instead by a few sharp blows aimed at bringing down the regime of Saddam Hussein.
If the war does go as planned, much of the credit is likely to be given to Defence Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld. He pushed Army General Tommy R. Franks, to come up with a more innovative plan.
But it appears that the effect of his approach has been to dismantle Powell’s legacies at the Pentagon: a powerful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the so-called Powell Doctrine.
The doctrine maintains that when the US goes to war, it should always go in with overwhelming force, pursue limited objectives, and disengage as soon as possible through what came to be called an ‘‘exit strategy.’’
Meanwhile, the strategy now unfolding in Iraq, which Rumsfeld played a role in shaping, begins with restrained use of force, followed by escalation of bombing, and the occupation of another country. If the plan works, the Powell Doctrine will have been discarded. (LATWP)