Strategy behind ceasefire

Developments on the ground turned out very differently. Domel was never captured, leaving no scope for further advances. But Leh was not only relieved, the strategic road linking it with Srinagar via Kargil was secured before a UN-inspired ceasefire came into force on January 1, 1949. Limited attempts have been made to alter the alignment of the resulting line since then for tactical reasons, but its overall contours have not been challenged, except in Siachen, where it was not delineated. Each side blames the other for infringements and swears to respect it. In fact, the line has survived because it is based more on political than military realities.

This may explain why Brigadier (later Lt. Gen.) L.P. Sen was stopped in his tracks when advancingbeyond Uri along the road to Muzaffarabad in late June under instructions from New Delhi. He was ordered to divert his column on to a side road, over the Haji Pir Pass, to relieve Poonch which had been under prolonged siege. In his book Operation Rescue, Lt. Gen. S.K. Sinha states that they were ordered to stop further offensive operations towards the Pakistan border in response to an appeal from the UN. By then, Pakistan had acknowledged its regular troops were in the battle. A visit by a UNCIP (UN Commission for India and Pakistan) team was expected. When the ceasefire took effect, the line separating Indian and Pakistani troops was drawn at Chakothi, just beyond Uri, now a section of the Line of Control.

I was then in Kashmir to cover the war. Senior army officers did not disguise their disappointment with the instructions from New Delhi and there was much speculation about the reasons behind the untimely diversion to Poonch. But not for long. The restrictions were limited to moves towards the Pakistanborder in western Kashmir and Jammu. There were no inhibitions on advancing north and east. Gurez, north of the Kashmir valley, was cleared in July. I was able to hitch a ride when Major Gen. K.S. Thimayya, (later Chief of the Army Staff), then commanding our forces in the Valley, took Sheikh Abdullah, then heading the state government, on a victory visit to Gurez.

Then, two months before the ceasefire, General Thimayya rode the first tank to be deployed at such high altitudes, to break through the Pakistani defences on the Zojila pass. From there our troops pressed on via places that are back in the news today: Matayan, Dras, Kargil, where they were joined by a detachment from the Leh garrison. The road to Leh and other strategic areas of Ladakh facing Pakistan and China was cleared in winter conditions barely a month before the ceasefire. Had the operation failed, the ceasefire line would have been drawn at Zojila.

Why did New Delhi restrain our forces from advancing west-ward, not elsewhere? Theorders, General Sinha told me later, originated from the Prime Minister. It seems that Nehru was not keen to take control of areas beyond the influence of Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference which supported the state’s accession to India. Abdullah had a loyal following among the Kashmiri-speaking people of the Valley and in parts of Jammu. But this did not extend to people living near the border of Pakistan, particularly in Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur. Men from there formed the bulk of the `Azad Kashmir’ forces who had earlier revolted against Maharaja Hari Singh’s rule and had joined with Pakistan. Their people would have opposed accession to India in the event of a reference to the people to which New Delhi was committed. This would have been evident to UN observers.

On the other hand, there was no question that the sparse population of Ladakh, mostly Buddhists and Shias, would support India. But most people living in north Kashmir were known to support Pakistan. Nehru did not want to extend Indianrule over hostile areas.

There was no doubt that the bulk of the Kashmiri-speaking people of the Valley would vote for India in a plebiscite. Nehru had won Abdullah’s regard and friendship a decade before Partition. He was even detained by Hari Singh in June 1946 when entering his domain to try to free the imprisoned Sheikh. The secular outlook of his National Conference was announced when its name was changed from Muslim Conference. In October 1947, Nehru had delayed accepting Hari Singh’s appeal for military aid against the advancing raiders until the Maharaja reluctantly pledged to place Sheikh Abdullah at the head of the state administration. Popular support for accession to India was thus ensured wherever the National Conference held sway.

This was the political basis of the ceasefire line, renamed Line of Control in 1972. In effect, it has been treated as an international border. In the 1965 war, Indian troops took the strategic Haji Pir pass on the other side of the line at considerable cost, butwere obliged to withdraw in accordance with the terms of the Tashkent Agreement. After the Bangladesh war, India’s unstated objective was to convert the ceasefire line into a recognised international border. Despite having 90,000 prisoners-of-war and large tracts of West Pakistan territory in her grasp, Indira Gandhi accepted Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s plea at the Simla Conference in June 1972 that he should not be embarrassed but be trusted to respect the LoC. She was also concerned about domestic reactions to giving up India’s claim to the entire state. The prisoners and the territory were returned. India continues to pay the price for believing Bhutto.