Shaken by Shanghai

But the more focused sections of the American establishment are finally waking up to the challenge unveiled by the Shanghai summit under the leadership of China and Russia.

Take for example the assertion that the SCO has a role ‘‘in maintaining peace and stability in the zone of its responsibility’’. This claim to a special sphere of security influence in Central Asia is reinforced by another injunction that that the member states will ‘‘not participate in alliances and associations’’ which could damage the interests of the other states of the grouping.

In a traditional formulation that identifies security alliances, the SCO declaration set out a mechanism for cooperation in the face of shared threats: ‘‘In case of emergency events, jeopardizing peace, stability and security in the region, the SCO member states will immediately establish contacts and start consultations on a rapid joint response so as to defend, to the utmost extent, the interests of the Organisation and its member states.’’

Who, indeed, will decide what is the threat and how to cope with it? Of course, China and Russia. Beneath all the rhetoric of equality of states and new principles of international relations, the SCO summit is about classic balance of power politics.

Central Asian gains

Alliances between smaller and larger powers are often seen as a disadvantage to the former. But the history of alliances tells us that the smaller ones might often gain important leverages with the other power against whom the alliance is directed.

The SCO’s mandate that the member states should not align with other powers or give bases and facilities to other great powers is not easy to implement.

What the SCO does in the interim is to significantly increase the bargaining power of the smaller states vis-a-vis the United States. If the US is serious about retaining its influence in Central Asia, it will have to offer better political and economic terms to the smaller states of the region.

For one it was American emphasis on democracy and internal political reform that pushed Uzbekistan closer to China and Russia. A change of policy here is not impossible for the United States.

Kazakhstan, which has become adept at playing the game with competing great powers, would by no means be averse to exploiting its current geopolitical opportunities.

The stronger the pressure from Russia and China on the smaller nations of the SCO to toe the line, the greater will be the Central Asian asking price in Washington.

For those in Delhi who assert that balance of power politics is dead, the Shanghai summit and its consequences will form an exquisite lesson in realpolitik.

Get the rift?

After urging the US to pull out its military facilities in the region last year, the SCO has now laid out the framework of a regional alliance of Russia and China in Central Asia. Make no mistake. The US will pick up the gauntlet thrown down by China and Russia in Central Asia.

One option for America is to explore the potential differences between Russia and China. Washington knows the SCO has relevance only so long as the dominant powers of the organisation—Beijing and Moscow—sing from the same sheet of music.

Washington will also bet that the interests of Moscow and Beijing need not always coincide. That large neighbours don’t always love each other is a dictum the US knows well.

Having taken advantage of the rift between Chinese and Russian communists during the Cold war, the US would want to probe the potential differences between Moscow and Beijing.

Being the dominant power, of course, always allows Washington to make marginal adjustments to its policy to shift the dynamics of relations among other powers.

Beijing’s doctrine

While assessing the power play in Shanghai, analysts in the US are examining the potential changes in the Chinese military doctrine to defend its growing economic and energy interests in Central Asia.

In other words, is China ready to back its new politics in Central Asia with a military muscle? In a recent issue, the monthly magazine Far Eastern Economic Review asked the question whether Beijing will go to war in securing the Central Asian oil.

A growing body of military literature in China has begun to debate the military implications of the nation’s dependence on critical resource inputs from outside.

It stands to reason that if China has put in huge stakes in energy resources in another country, say in Central Asia, Beijing is not just going to sit back watch them go up in smoke.

Historically, all great powers have sought to defend their economic interests abroad. China will be no exception in contemplating use of force for securing economic objectives. India too might be in a similar situation in future.

But unlike Delhi, that revels in its own self-delusions, the Chinese security establishment has now begin to develop doctrines and capabilities that will allow its armed forces to operate beyond its own borders.

raja.mohan@expressindia.com