Rice has got it right

The US secretary of state has sought to allay fears of a South Asian arms race by citing India8217;s restraint

A medium-level official of the US State Department suggested in a speech to the Confederation of Indian Industries that India should further define its minimum credible deterrent. The official would have done well to get some tutorials on the subject from Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. She has explained to the US Congress, even while praising India8217;s restraint, that the size of India8217;s arsenal would be determined by local dynamics.

India8217;s nuclear doctrine has two components that go together 8212; no first use and a credible minimum deterrent. In traditional Western strategic thought nuclear strategy envisaged a first strike, deliberately aggressive, to disarm the adversary and thereafter a second strike capability after the adversary8217;s retaliation. The US and the Soviet Union were two nuclear weapon powers which could have wiped out civilisation several times over. Nuclear confrontation between them was a zero sum game. The conventional Western mind would have to rid itself of such cold war dogmas to understand India8217;s nuclear doctrine.

India, China and Pakistan are functioning in a world where there are two other far more powerful nuclear powers, which 8212; if they so choose 8212; are in a position to intervene and influence the nuclear exchanges among this lower order of nuclear weapon powers. Therefore these nations have to factor into their calculations the possibility of punishing interventions by the two foremost nuclear powers. The use of nuclear weapons by any nation is not in the national security interest of any nuclear power. The expectation by lower order nations, therefore, will be the possibility of intervention. The US Quadrennial Defense Review talks of the possibility of loss of control over weapons by a nuclear capable nation and of preparations to deal with such a situation. This kind of planning should make powers like Pakistan uncertain about the consequences of a first resort to nuclear weapons.

The credible minimum deterrence, practised in tandem with a no first use strategy, is intended to absorb an aggressive first strike by the adversary and then impose a punitive punishment in retaliation. Therefore it should take into account the adversary8217;s capability to eliminate a part of one8217;s own arsenal in its first strike and the survivability of one8217;s own arsenal to inflict punitive punishment. The US strategists as well as their Indian followers in high places who questioned India8217;s need for a strategic triad, did not have an adequate understanding of the crucial consideration that credible minimum deterrent is inversely proportional to the survivability of the arsenal. The survivability factor is also related to the kind of vector for the delivery of the weapon, dispersal, camouflage and the adversary8217;s surveillance capability. In factoring in these considerations, India has to take into account not only Pakistan but also China, which has significant space surveillance capabilities. This is the reason why the credible minimum deterrent was described as a dynamic concept since all the above factors are variables subject to continuous innovations and improvements.

India8217;s foreseeable nuclear threat expectations arise mostly from Pakistan. One has to assume in the absence of proof to the contrary that China continues to assist Pakistan in its nuclear programme. All these factors were taken into account when a credible minimum deterrent doctrine was formulated. Since then the Indian security situation has improved with the ongoing enhancement of ties with the US, a strategic partnership with the EU and Russia and strategic dialogue with China.

India has been building up its credible minimum deterrent at a very modest pace. The number of reactors kept out of safeguards 8212; eight 8212; according to the views expressed by some Americans during the US Congressional hearings, will give India a capacity of building up to 50 warheads per year. Some of the nuclear ayatollahs are worried that India may use the full capacity to produce weapons and start adding 50 warheads per year to its arsenal. They argue that this will provoke an arms race in South Asia. Rice has sought to allay these fears by citing India8217;s restraint in the past.

One hopes India has a tentative target for the credible minimum deterrent. It is logical to aim to build towards that in a reasonably early period, well before the Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty is finalised. It will be futile to argue that since the concept of a credible minimum deterrent is a dynamic one, our production of warheads will be an endless process. That will only mean that the phrase 8216;credible minimum deterrent8217; is being used as mere rhetoric without an understanding of the concept. Further research to improve weapons has nothing to do with the size of the arsenal. Above all we should not give an impression that a discussion on the size of a credible minimum deterrent is avoided because of reluctance to reach a decision on the issue.

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