My first contact with General Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, the commander of Pakistan’s Eastern Command, was on the radio. It was December 13, 1971, and I had contacted him over the wireless to tell him that he should surrender and that we would protect all ethnic minorities and that they would be treated according to the principles of the Geneva Convention.On the 14th, we bombed Government House and the governor resigned. Niazi went to the American consulate with the proposal that there would be ceasefire, that the withdrawal of the Pakistan army and ethnic minorities via Wagah will be done under the UN, and that there will be no trial for war crimes. This was sent to Washington and we were informed about it on December 15. On the same day, there was a Polish resolution in the UN asking for Pakistan’s ceasefire and withdrawal (Poland, remember, was part of the Soviet bloc). Z.A. Bhutto tore it up and had walked off in a huff. The UN was still in session.On December 16, I was ordered to go and get the surrender. I left Calcutta for Dacca by helicopter and was met by UN officials, who wanted to accompany me to arrange the withdrawal. I thanked them but said that I did not need their help. Fighting was still going on between the Mukti Bahini and the Pakistan army. Our troops had not entered Dacca at that point.Around mid-day, I got through to Niazi’s headquarters and asked him to stop the fighting and implement the ceasefire. He did this. The draft surrender document was read out to him. He had tears in his eyes. He said, “I had only come to arrange the ceasefire and the withdrawal of the Pakistan army and ethnic minorities to Wagah. This is unconditional surrender, which is unacceptable.” I said it was not “unconditional” and that we would protect the soldiers and their families and the ethnic minorities provided he agreed to sign the surrender document.I left them to consider it and returned half an hour later. The typed draft of the document was still lying where I had left it on the table. I asked him if he accepted it. He did not reply. This question was put to him three times. He still did not reply. I then picked up the document and told him that I took it as accepted. He still did not answer.I then went into the modalities of the surrender. I told him that he would surrender in public at the Race Course Maidan in front of the people of Dacca. He objected to this, but I insisted. We then drove to the airport in his car to pick up General J.S. Aurora and the retinue who had come to witness the surrender. The surrender was negotiated and signed within four hours. When Niazi signed the document, there were tears in his eyes. Those who had gathered to watch had wanted to mob him. It was with difficulty that we could put him into a car and drive him away.General Niazi was a man of personal courage — in fact, wherever the Pakistan army fought, they had fought with courage and determination. But he was not a good strategist. He wanted to defend the towns and territories which were impossible to defend and which, ultimately, led to the collapse of his army. We bypassed all centres of resistance and went straight for Dacca. At the time of his surrender he had 30,000 troops in Dacca. We had some 3,000.It must have been an extremely difficult period for him. He came across as a very smart and confident man, but I think at some point his nerves gave way. He later recalled how let down he had felt by General Yayha Khan, who had presented him with the difficult task of fighting against a popular war of liberation without adequate support and resources.
