The politics of Kerala, the state with the longest history of coalition governments in India, has often been characterised as the politics of two fronts. The competition between the Left Democratic Front (LDF) and the United Democratic Front (UDF) ended a period of instability and short duration governments and put Kerala on a trajectory marked by the alternation of two fronts. Now that coalitions are the norm rather than an aberration in many other parts of the country, the Kerala experience deserves a closer look.The year 1982 marks a sharp divide in the political history of Kerala — between instability and predictability. In the pre-1982 phase only one government completed its full term. Kerala had already seen the Bihar experience of May 2005 in 1965. The assembly was not convened, and majorities were not tested, and president’s rule continued until the next election in 1967. What Uttar Pradesh is going through since the 1990s, Kerala saw in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s. It was a phase of severe instability interspersed with spells of president’s rule. The fifth legislative assembly, for instance, saw four governments change besides president’s rule. The sixth saw two changes of government and two spells of president’s rule. Kerala, therefore, has had its share of stormy times before it became an exemplar for coalition politics.Contrary to popular belief, political parties are learning entities. Parties functioning over a period of time in a particular environment, where there is no major change or disruption in the institutional framework, understand the workings of that system, adapt to it and attempt to make the best use of the existing set-up to further their ends. The parliamentary federal system with a simple-plurality system of electoral laws we have in India offers distinct incentives. One, the electoral system encourages pre-election alliances. Two, in an executive-dominated system it pays to be in or at least close to government. And finally, it is not costly to play a regional or even sub-regional role in a federation.Coalition building and alliance management mechanisms form the next level of lessons. While the coordination mechanism has received widespread attention, the alliance building strategy used by the two fronts in Kerala has been neglected. It is a combination of both alliance building and coordination that has brought predictability and stability. Though the LDF and the UDF are on different sides of the political battle their strategies are surprisingly similar.Given the small size of the assembly and the closeness of electoral contests in Kerala, no group or territory can be ignored. This poses a dilemma to the two “coalition makers”, CPM and INC, of catering to sectional interests and yet being relevant in both the national and state game. A simple aggregating and catch-all strategy has its limits. Consequently, both have simply outsourced competition. Outsourcing is a term we are now familiar with. Basically, it means handing over certain tasks to reduce costs. The outsourcer is then able to focus on its core competencies and avoid getting caught in activities secondary to the business process. Besides reducing costs it is supposed to lead to an efficient use of resources. Though there are hazards of drawing lessons from the business world, they still have heuristic value. The territorial concentration of communities has given rise to sectional parties like the Muslim League and the Kerala Congress family of parties. The interests of these parties are primarily limited to the state level. Though they contest a smaller number of seats and articulate specific interests, what enhances their importance is the fact that they have territorially concentrated support bases. Both fronts have a number of smaller parties and are thus representative of the societal distribution, each in its own way. The LDF does not have a Muslim component, as the CPM is traditionally strong in the Malabar region. So how does outsourcing work?The outsourcing is based on the spatial strengths of parties. In territories where the coalition maker is weak or the societal composition is skewed disproportionately it is left to an appropriate partner within the front. For instance, the Congress has almost ceded Malabar to the League. Similarly in the Christian dominated territories, the battle is through the Kerala Congress family of parties. Consequently the direct fight between the coalition makers is limited. This strategy has enabled the fronts to achieve maximum efficiency in winning seats.Coordination mechanisms, a contribution of Kerala coalitions to the coalition lexicon are actually an institutionalisation of this relationship between political parties. Coalition makers do not have to tailor specific campaign strategies, stretch too much to accommodate diverse socio-cultural or economic interests and find the “right” candidates. The sectional parties manage their territories. Once in power, it is payback time for their support bases enabling the front to cater to the peculiarities of different groups. In the process, coalition makers have managed the growth of sectional parties. In sharp contrast to Tamil Nadu, sub-regional parties have been restricted to the state level. They are stunted to particular pockets reducing their threat potential. Their ambitions to the national stage, if any, are catered to through Rajya Sabha quotas. The Kerala approach therefore puts a check on incessant fragmentation of the party system at the national level.Coalition, Kerala style, however has its drawbacks. Institutionalised patronage politics is one of the costs of outsourcing. The sectional parties are focused on targeting favourable pay-offs. A closer look at the Kerala experience reveals that the fronts are actually two well-oiled political machines at work with an efficient system of vote catching and subsequent distribution of payments in the form of offices, policies and patronage. Making sense of how parties link with each other, therefore, provides the clue to understanding politics in a period of shrinking political bases, reduced ideological bonds and conflicting interests. The writer teaches political science at Panjab University, Chandigarh
