Peacemaker in Lhasa

With a vehemence that startled the gathering around the table, Comrade Tu signalled that the point of the Indian visit was not really to answer questions about “feudal and reactionary” monks like the Dalai Lama who had staged a “military resurgence” in 1959 (when he fled to India), but to tell us about the “democratic reforms” that had since changed the face of Tibet. Whatever the provocation — in this case presumably by some Indian journalists — the central government would not eat its words.

Tu Deng’s tough talk came back to mind a fortnight ago when the Pareechu river, on its return journey through Tibet, couldn’t make up its mind whether it wanted to burst its breaches or not. And as the water level rose, Beijing just would not allow an Indian team of water experts to inspect the site. First, a long silence. Then, it became far too dangerous to go there. Next, landslides in the area had made it downright impossible. Beijing relented by opening a hotline and downloading the information to New Delhi. One arm of the government, the external affairs ministry, said it was satisfied with China’s cooperation, but another arm, the water resources ministry, continued to privately grumble that the foreign office was just not doing enough about pressing Beijing.

Could Beijing have allowed the Indian team to visit Lhasa and speak to its counterparts, if the site was too dangerous? Could it have reassured them by giving them access to officials in faraway Beijing, since that’s where the most important data must really be? Or, was Beijing, having once spoken, not going to eat its words? Similar arguments in the past on the eastern front — over sharing of hydrological data on the Yarlung Tsangpo, that starts in Tibet and travels eastwards to transform itself into the Brahmaputra — had given a rough edge to bilateral negotiations not so long ago. Until former Chinese premier Zhu Rongji graciously told the then foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, that there really was no problem, Beijing would give New Delhi the data for $1!

Point is, Beijing insists upon complete control not only at home — witness the muted resentment in Tibet, in the Uighur Autonomous Region, in Inner Mongolia, indeed in most areas where ethnic minorities dominate over the Han Chinese — but also wants to “manage” the discourse abroad. Unlike democratic societies (like India), where disagreement and negotiation are integral aspects of the polity, Beijing brooks no argument. The “anti-imperialist” argument is made with such unilateral intensity (when China was “enslaved” and “subjugated” by foreigners during the Opium wars, etc, and will never allow itself to be “split” again as the Dalai Lama wants to do with Tibet), that it simply refuses to listen to anyone else. Saving face, a much-vaunted value by the Chinese, is largely denied to others.

An insurgency on the lines of Kashmir, for example, would never be allowed to take place in China. Recent dissidence in the Uighur region, manifesting itself in demands for more federal control, was dealt with severely by Beijing, by a policy called “strike hard” that simply executed those who protested too much. Discussions with the Dalai Lama and his envoys, Beijing has repeated ad nauseam, cannot be held unless the Tibetan leader stops talking about “independence” for Tibet.

Certainly, that’s an unexceptional position and one that the world, including New Delhi, supports. It is in no one’s interest, least of all a multiethnic society like India, to even allow the impression that secessionist feelings can be rewarded. As far as reassuring China is concerned, there are no issues here. From 1954 to 2003, India has variously reaffirmed that Tibet is a part of China. And now, as China grows to be a major world power — even a fleeting visit to Beijing or Shanghai can blow your mind — it is in its own interest that troubles in Tibet and elsewhere are dealt with using friendliness not force.

In this brave, new post-modern world in which Asia’s largest powers are looking for new areas of convergence, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to see Tibet can be a magic card. That India can do its bit by bringing the Chinese and the Tibetans to see the other’s point of view. “India” is such a magic word in Tibet today, that it brings a rash of goose-pimples to your skin. The Buddha’s Middle Path approach seems to have been specially made with New Delhi in mind.

India could offer new initiatives in Tibet, from coping with HIV/AIDS to software technology to getting the Archaeological Survey of India to restore defaced monuments and monasteries (as it is doing in Cambodia), so as to renew the ancient connection. If the Dalai Lama is a considerable thorn in China’s underbelly it doesn’t know how to extract, India’s long association with Buddhism and the Tibetan Buddhist leader places it in just the right position. Persuading Beijing to see the worldwide respect it gets from at least hearing out the Dalai Lama’s point of view, by listening to his envoys repeat themselves that the idea of “independence” was given up more than a decade ago and that they are now only seeking “cultural and spiritual autonomy” for Tibet, could be another step to solve the dragon jigsaw.

Perhaps all three sides could begin to seriously start thinking about ways and means to save face all around, so that the Dalai Lama can honourably return home to Lhasa. Nobody need eat their words, they can all be safely consigned to the Pareechu. But India must realise that her stakes in restoring the stability of the Himalayas were never higher.