
The two-month old controversy over the office of profit issue has not died down. Federal and state governments are likely to come up with legislation to 8220;solve8221; this new problem facing our legislators. No party is likely to vote against these bills, since the MLAs and MPs of almost all parties hold 8220;offices of profit8221;.
In this debate, no one has yet asked the question: why were the drafters of our Constitution far-sighted or naively idealistic to have thought of disqualifying legislators from holding 8220;offices of profit8221;? Why was this principle considered important 58 years ago, and is it still relevant?
If an MLA or an MP holds an office of profit, he is combining in himself the functions of both the legislative and the executive, which goes against the spirit of our Constitution. Citizens have elected legislators, so that they can legislate which also means that assembly and Parliament sessions must work and not execute, for which the people have appointed bureaucrats.
If MLAs and MPs hold an OOP, then they8217;re also trying to carry out executive functions, whether or not they are being paid or whether or not they are being given official sanction. How can an MP be a good legislator if he also holds an executive position? How will he be able to independently scrutinise the executive? Logically, one can then argue that the secretary of a government department can also be a member of the legislative, perhaps of the Upper House.
If it is obviously wrong for a bureaucrat to be a legislator, then it is equally wrong for a legislator to carry out executive functions. This is why we have the office of profit rule, and that is why I believe that this list of offices of profit that are exempted should not be expanded in any forthcoming bill; rather, that there should have fewer such offices.
The writer is a manager in a private company