Omar’s secrets are safer with America

Sheikh’s threat to spill the dark secrets of Pakistan’s pro-militancy policies in Kashmir and perhaps elsewhere prevented his extradition to the US in February, when he was first arrested. No known contact has taken place between him and US officials since. Bringing him to the US now would be politically impossible for Gen Musharraf, who is dealing daily with threats to his life from Muslim extremists.

But interrogating Sheikh on Pakistani soil while his lawyers work through the justice system’s tortuous appeals process would allow US Special Forces and the FBI, already in Pakistan hunting for al Qaeda operatives with local troops, an important glimpse into the world of Islamic terrorism.

US authorities should insist on having that opportunity. Decoding Sheikh—known for his politeness in private school—may prove invaluable.

Determining what motivated the British-born son of a Pakistani clothes merchant to become a world-class terrorist may help US authorities protect other American citizens in countries where al Qaeda cells are known to operate.

Sheikh’s modus operandi is particularly troubling because, like al Qaeda, it relies almost exclusively on highly specialised but distinctly separate two- and three-member cells, each with plausible deniability of the involvement of another cell’s role in an operation of the type that cost Pearl his life.

Deciphering what drives these cells, how they are organised and how they distribute responsibility for the component acts that constitute a larger terrorist act are vital to our security. Little if any of this information would be voluntarily provided to us by Pakistani intelligence, which is bent on preserving its trade secrets for nefarious operations in regions like Kashmir.

Kidnapping unsuspecting Westerners with elaborately constructed traps is at the heart of Sheikh’s brand of terrorism. Sheikh, who disappeared into Pakistan’s underworld after being freed by India along with Maulana Masood Azhar and another militant in December 1999, was later linked to September 11 hijacker Mohamed Atta through a $100,000 transfer to Atta’s accounts.

Understanding that underworld and how money was moved around in it during the period when Sheikh was out of sight is a vital part of US efforts to unveil the system that supports terrorism on foreign soil, where hundreds of sleeper cells with men like Sheikh could be activated.

The risks to Musharraf, already severe from his oscillating policies aimed at reining in terrorists in Kashmir to avoid a wider war with India, will not measurably increase if he allows US officials access to Sheikh.

Since it is a near certainty that some act of terrorism will occur against foreign citizens on Pakistani soil while Sheikh’s appeal is under review, it is time for Musharraf to demonstrate the sincerity of his commitment to the United States to help unravel the webs of terrorism his intelligence agencies spent two decades spinning into a global threat.

To do so would be a final act honouring Pearl’s memory. (LA Times-Washington Post)