Nothing strategic about it

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is visiting India when the conservatives have further entrenched themselves in the Iranian power structure by winning two-thirds...

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is visiting India when the conservatives have further entrenched themselves in the Iranian power structure by winning two-thirds of seats in the recent parliamentary elections. Though the reformists have underlined their decent performance despite the heavy restrictions placed on their operations, it is being pointed out that a new 8220;radical conservatism8221; is gaining momentum in Iran that is beholden to his agenda. In such a political milieu, Ahmadinejad will continue to use the nuclear issue to shore up his domestic support base, especially as dissatisfaction increases with his economic policies.

Ever since the United States and India embarked on the journey to transform their ties by changing the global nuclear order to accommodate India, Iran has emerged as a litmus test that India has to pass, from time to time, to the satisfaction of the US policy-makers. Yet, the American focus on India-Iran ties has been highly disproportionate to the substantive realities that underpin this relationship, a result more of a response to the exigencies of domestic politics than to the regional political realities. Interestingly, the Indian Left has also made Iran an issue emblematic of India8217;s 8220;strategic autonomy8221; and has used this stick to coerce the Indian government into following an ideological foreign policy. A close examination of the India-Iran relationship reveals an underdeveloped relationship despite all the spin being put on it by both sides.

On the crucial issue of energy, Iran supplies only about 8 per cent of Indian oil imports compared to Saudi Arabia8217;s around 30 per cent. Moreover, both the major energy deals signed by the two sides are in limbo as of now. India8217;s 25-year 22 billion worth agreement with Iran for the supply of LNG has not moved an inch since 2005 as it requires India to build an LNG plant in Iran which would need American components and this might end up violating the US Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. The other project involving the construction of a 1700 mile, 7 billion pipeline to carry natural gas from Iran to India via Pakistan is also stuck for many reasons. Both projects have also brought home to Indians the unreliability of Iran as a trade partner. There are also differences between the national oil companies of Iran and India over the legal interpretation of the contract for the export of LNG to India.

This deal was signed before Ahmadinejad was elected president and was tied to a relatively low market price for crude. India considers the deal final and binding, while Iran has argued that it is not binding because it has not been ratified by the Iranian Supreme Economic Council. Both India and Pakistan have contended that Tehran offer a price for gas in line with global practices for long-term contracts and have rejected Iran8217;s pricing formula. There is little evidence that Iran would be a reliable partner for India in energy security. A number of important projects have either been rejected by Iran or are yet to be finalised due to its changing of terms and conditions.

The nuclear issue is equally complex. India and Iran have long held significantly different perceptions of the global nuclear order. While India believes that Iran has a right to pursue civilian nuclear energy, it has insisted that it should clarify the doubts raised by the IAEA in so far as Iran8217;s compliance with the NPT is concerned. India has long maintained that it does not see any further nuclear proliferation as being in its own interests. This position has as much to do with India8217;s desire to project itself as a responsible nuclear state as with the very real dangers that further proliferation in its extended neighbourhood would pose to its own security. It was with this mind that India not only voted against Iran at the IAEA in 2005 and 2006 but also went ahead and imposed a ban on the export of any material and technology to Iran that could be used in developing nuclear weapons and delivery systems, as demanded by the Security Council.

Meanwhile, with Iran, the defence relationship remains not only sporadic but also circumscribed by India8217;s growing linkages with Israel, soon to be India8217;s largest defence partner. India-Iran ties are also diverging on Afghanistan where recent indications that sections of the Iranian military may be arming the Taliban so as to weaken the American military are troubling for India. And as tensions rise between the Sunni Arab regimes and Iran, India8217;s larger stakes in the area might propel it in a direction not very conducive to healthy India-Iran ties.

The reality that confronts India is that notwithstanding US optimism, India has very little leverage over Iran and notwithstanding all the hype about India-Iran civilisational ties, there is hardly anything 8220;strategic8221; in India8217;s relationship with Iran.

The writer teaches at King8217;s College, London

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