
The scene is, in diplomatic terms, too comic to imagine. An Indian prime minister is valiantly trying to defend India8217;s nuclear policy before the US government. An US secretary of state then intervenes: 8220;But Mr Prime Minister, your own foreign minister seems to think that India8217;s exercise of its nuclear options was a mistake.8221; Unfortunately, Natwar Singh8217;s remarks in Seoul have brought such a scenario out of the realm of fantasy into the realm of diplomatic possibility. His suggestion that India8217;s nuclear programme might be the occasion for some regret is an indiscretion of the highest order. It would have been one thing to caution the two Koreas about the pitfalls of pursuing their nuclear programme; it is quite another to contravene consistent Indian policy on the matter.
On the surface, Singh8217;s remarks display an astonishing historical amnesia. They belie the fact that all prime ministers, from Jawaharlal Nehru to Manmohan Singh, have sought to keep India8217;s nuclear options open. This is one issue on which attempting a partisan interpretation just does not wash. But, more seriously, Singh is acting in an official capacity and the tenor of his remarks is not stated government policy. If he feels passionately that India8217;s nuclear programme should be the cause of some regret, he has two options. Either he can persuade the government to adopt that line or, failing that, he can resign. What he cannot do is unilaterally make policy on such a sensitive matter. Such statements also give the impression that there8217;s confusion about who is in charge of foreign policy. The prime minister ought to act quickly to make this clear.