No-entry zones for defectors

It took another six years before the Constitution (Thirty-second Amendment) Bill, 1973 was introduced in Lok Sabha on May 16, 1973 to implement the recommendations of the Chavan Committee report. The Bill, however, lapsed on account of dissolution of the House. Thereafter, the Constitution (Forty-eighth Amendment) Bill, 1979 was introduced in Lok Sabha which also contained similar provisions for disqualification on the grounds of defection. This Bill also lapsed. Finally, the Constitution (Fifty-second Amendment) Act, 1985 was enacted incorporating the Tenth Schedule providing for disqualification on the ground of defection.

The object of the Tenth Schedule is to curb political defections that are motivated by the lure of office or similar considerations which endanger the foundation of our democracy. The remedy proposed is to disqualify the errant member of Parliament or state legislature who is found to have defected.

By now it is amply clear that the Act has not achieved the desired objective. A fresh look, therefore, is required at the Tenth Schedule. The Committee on Defections had inter alia recommended that a defector should be debarred, for a period of one year or till such time as he resigned his seat and got himself re-elected, from appointment to the office of a minister including deputy minister or speaker or deputy speaker, or any post carrying salaries or allowances to be paid from the Consolidated Fund of India or of the state or from the funds of government undertakings in the public sector in addition to those to which the defector might be entitled as legislator.

The simple prohibition disentitling a member of legislature to be sworn in as a minister or to hold any office of profit under the government will be far more effective to combat the menace of our unprincipled defection. Such disqualification should equally apply to every member of a splinter group even when the group consists of one-third of the members of the legislative party. If the seven UP MLAs who have been sworn in as ministers knew that they would never become ministers, would they have defected at all?

The other distressing aspect of the implementation of the law of defection has been the decisions of the speakers on disputed defections. A speaker is expected to be independent and impartial. However, on issues of disqualification on the ground of defection the decisions of speakers have unfortunately been often perverse and illegal. The decision has a direct impact on the continuance of the speaker. The motions of no-confidence against the government and the speaker are usually simultaneous as threatened in the UP Assembly. Interestingly, in both the earlier Constitution (Thirty Second Amendment) Bill, 1973 and the Constitution (Forty-Eighth Amendment) Bill, 1978, determination of disputed disqualification was left to the Election Commission as in the case of other disqualifications under articles 102 and 103 in the case of members of Parliament and Articles 191 and 192 in the case of members of legislatures of the states. Considering the repeated failure of speakers to discharge their functions under the Tenth Schedule honestly and independently, it is necessary now to vest this jurisdiction in an independent body like the Election Commission.

Both these amendments on the basis of the provisions of the earlier Constitution amendment Bills will go a long way in curbing the defection as well as the corruption which goes with it. Will Parliament enact such provisions shutting the door on corruption in the 21st century? But where are the honest legislators? Today in the UP legislature, 122 out of 403 members have criminal records. Could anything be more gloomy?

(The writer is a former Congress MP)