No alibi for UPA

The dithering in New Delhi has created space for political parties in Srinagar to seize upon the issue. Who can blame the politicians for demanding something that is at once popular and has a reasonable chance of being implemented?

This, in turn, has led to a simulated outrage in Delhi8217;s strategic community on how a major national security issue is being 8216;politicised8217;, and an insistence that troop disposition is a 8216;technical issue8217; that can only be decided by the military brass and the defence ministry bureaucracy.

Nothing could be farther from common sense. The use of force by a state, either at home to curb an insurgency or abroad against another nation, is always a political decision. While professional advice from the military and security bureaucracy provides the necessary inputs, it is politics that must always command the gun.

When former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee chose to announce a unilateral cease-fire in J038;K in 2000, decided to end it in May 2001 and invite General Musharraf to India, mobilised the military against Pakistan in December 2001, or extended the hand of friendship to Islamabad in a speech at Srinagar in April 2003, they were all strategic decisions taken by an elected political leadership. A political leader may or may not get it right every time. But in a democracy, the risk and reward of difficult decisions on use of force must necessarily stay with the national leadership of the day.

On his part, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, from the very first days in office more than three years ago, had repeatedly signaled his commitment to change the dynamic in Kashmir and continue the bold effort by Vajpayee to transform Indo-Pak relations. He has also been prepared to take the political risks inherent in this commitment.

In the extended debate on troop reductions in Kashmir, Manmohan Singh has repeatedly signaled that he is not averse to it. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out that a move in that direction fits in with everything the PM has sought to do in J038;K and with Pakistan.

The recent review of the security situation in J038;K by the defence secretary and the personal appraisal of the conditions in the state by the defence minister, A.K. Antony, during his recent visit there are, hopefully, part of an effort by the UPA government to prepare the ground for the decision on troop cuts and not devices to delay the decision yet again.

One also hopes that the new terminology being devised 8212; for example 8216;troop reconfiguration8217; rather than 8216;reduction8217; 8212; is not a stratagem aimed at reducing the scope of the redisposition of the security forces in J038;K. For a genuine and lasting political effect, the redisposition of the troops in J038;K must be a substantive one. While an incremental approach towards troop cuts might be understandable, the UPA government should focus on demonstrating a fundamental change in the direction of India8217;s security strategy in J038;K.

Reducing the numbers of the security forces in J038;K can only be one important part of the military redisposition in J038;K. The perceived relationship between the size of deployment and effectiveness has always been an exaggerated one. For the military doctrine and political strategy are even more important for an effective counter-insurgency.

Redefining the profile of the military in J038;K should also involve the withdrawal of forces from at least those urban centres where violence has come down. Returning some troops to the barracks in J038;K and ending in-your-face patrolling and searches will feed positively into the dialogue between New Delhi and Srinagar.

The long-overdue decision on troop cuts in J038;K will reinforce the prospects for peace with Pakistan. While the recent turmoil in Pakistan has cast a shadow over the negotiations with Islamabad, the national security adviser, M.K. Narayanan, has made it quite clear in a recent TV interview that India considers Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf a credible interlocutor and a man 8220;we can do business with8221;.

Narayanan also confirmed that the peace talks with Pakistan have moved forward in recent months. India and Pakistan might be on the verge of a historic breakthrough in the negotiations for a settlement of the J038;K question. What holds it back now is Musharraf8217;s preoccupation with the internal situation of Pakistan.

The issue of troop cuts in Kashmir goes well beyond the debate on Musharraf8217;s future. Pakistan today faces one of the worst threats ever to its security as the Al Qaida and the Taliban, as well as the international community, are threatening its territorial sovereignty.

A significant troop cut in J038;K will signal India8217;s readiness to make it easier for the Pakistani nation to cope with the unprecedented existential threats to its western frontiers and lay the foundation for an enduring peace on its eastern borders.

The writer is professor at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore