On the evening of Sunday, November 6, having re-written post-Cold War history and, allegedly, told the prime minister that his removal from the Union cabinet would cause Jats to revolt, K. Natwar Singh was deep in discussion with his war council at his residence in central Delhi. At one point, eyewitnesses say, members of his family barged in, waved fingers and pronounced, “You will not resign.” Let the party and government dismiss you, went the family edict, and then you can take them on, expose them. The words used were a lot more colourful. So bolstered, or merely egged on, Natwar stood his ground the next day. He told Manmohan Singh and Sonia Gandhi that he would not leave the cabinet, no way. By the end of Monday, of course, he had become minister without portfolio, his mind already working overtime, probably, to figure out if he could still demand a seat in the Cabinet Committees on Political Affairs and Security. Blackmail is not unknown to coalition politics. Yet it is usually junior partners who talk tough, insisting on staying in the government or on a particular ministry — Mamata Banerjee in the NDA and Laloo Yadav in the UPA are cases in point. They bargain hard with the main party. Natwar presented a fairly unique case of a member of the core party holding the prime minister and party leadership hostage, and scoring at least some points. Yes, he’d lost his favourite ministry, but he was not in the wilderness predicted for him this past weekend. In surviving in the cabinet — somehow, anyhow — he had won half a victory. Alternatively — or perhaps as a corollary — he may have only prolonged his agony. Ever since the Volcker report was released, a certain attempt by the PMO to give Natwar a long rope and allow him to tie himself up in knots was apparent. Natwar didn’t disappoint. By resorting to the most injudicious media interviews of his life, he isolated himself more and more. Now, by keeping Natwar in the government, the Congress leadership has only pointed the opposition in the direction of a low-hanging fruit. “What could have been jhatka,” an observer remarked wryly, “has, thanks to Natwar’s cussedness, become halaal.” A demand for his absolute removal from the cabinet is bound to resurface as a suitably-televised “political crisis” later this month. Why is the Natwar episode destined for an early Phase II? Parliament meets on November 23, a day after the Bihar election results and a day before the possible vote on Iran at the IAEA. Both events could test relations within the UPA. That aside, from The Mitrokin Archive II—Volcker’s grandfather, sort of—to the adverse Supreme Court ruling on the dissolution of the Bihar assembly earlier this year to terrorism, there is much ammunition for the NDA. Finally, of course, there is what the BJP considers a half-baked attempt to investigate the allegations implicit in the Volcker report. For the moment, the government seems to suggest that the business dealings of Hamdaan Exports will be inquired into. The firm will be asked how it made payments in foreign exchange, in prima facie violation of currency laws. This is the worm’s eye view. Who was Hamdaan making the payments for? The Volcker report suggests it was doing so on behalf of Natwar and the Congress. Even if this is true, Justice R.S. Pathak and the good Virendra Dayal are hardly likely to find 16-page Iraqi oil allocation contracts signed by K. Natwar Singh or by the president of the All India Congress Committee. What is required is a systematic tracing of money flows from Masefield’s and Hamdaan’s bank accounts. Whom did Masefield pay—perhaps via Hamdaan—for the oil that Saddam Hussein is said to have allocated Natwar? The trail will probably lead to series of numbered accounts in a series of tax havens. An interrogation of Iraqi officials in the Saddam period—particularly those responsible for the oil allocations—will be necessary. Some of these people are in US custody, some could be accessed through the new Iraqi government. None of this can be done by a lone judge. It requires a rigorous criminal investigation, with Indian authorities seeking the help of foreign governments on the basis of a formal anti-corruption case, rather than vague violations of local currency laws by a small-time company. This is the sort of music the Manmohan Singh government is likely to face in Parliament later in November. To wriggle out of the mess, it will have to offer the opposition carrots. Will the first one involve asking Natwar to finally vacate his ministerial bungalow?
