N-race in Iran’s neighbourhood

Each of the new nuclear-aspirant states announced its decision in terms of electricity needs, energy diversification and the economic benefits of nuclear power. They spoke as well of the need to conserve oil and gas supplies for export earnings, and of the role of nuclear energy in efforts to retard global warming.

Notwithstanding the legitimate energy and economic motivations behind this sudden region-wide interest in nuclear power, political factors also play an important role.

Promotion of nuclear energy is one way in which Sunni states are trying to counter the rising sense of Shia empowerment following the 2006 Lebanon War.

The single most salient political factor, however, is Iran’s development of dual use nuclear technologies, which motivates some of its neighbours to seek fledgling nuclear capabilities of their own.

If Tehran’s nuclear programme is unchecked, there is reason for concern that it could in time prompt a regional cascade of proliferation among Iran’s neighbours. For some states, such as Saudi Arabia, an Iranian nuclear weapon would present a direct and dire threat. For others, such as Egypt and Turkey, the threat is more tied to concerns about the balance of power. If any one of Iran’s neighbours were to seek to acquire nuclear weapons in response, this would put additional pressure on others to do the same, because of intra-regional security and status considerations.

So far, none of the new nuclear aspirants in the region has yet been known to talk even privately about seeking nuclear weapons. What they want is the human and technical infrastructure associated with nuclear-energy programmes in order to provide a counterbalance to Iran.

Conclusion

The danger of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East, while real, is not imminent. No country is known or seriously believed to be currently pursuing a nuclear-weapons programme.

However, Iran’s programme could become a powerful regional proliferation driver, building on regional rivalry, security concerns and one-upmanship. These considerations are contributing to a regional surge in interest in nuclear energy.

The introduction of nuclear energy into the Middle East should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. To date, no commercial contracts have been signed; and most of the national plans have been limited to feasibility studies. There is time, therefore, to put in place a robust regime of policies and practices that can serve as a bulwark against a proliferation cascade in the region.

In the shadows

A brief assessment of the nuclear programmes in Iran’s neighbourhood—Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey, Algeria and Israel

Israel

Israel initiated a nuclear programme in the mid 1950s and crossed the weapons threshold about a decade later. Today, remaining outside the NPT, Israel is considered to be a de facto nuclear weapons state. Israel is alone in publicly characterising a nuclear Iran as a threat to the very survival of the state. A nuclear-armed Iran would erase Israel’s nuclear monopoly, its most distinct strategic asset… Israel’s leaders have emphasised their commitment to doing everything possible to prevent the advent of a nuclear Iran.

Algeria

Given that Algeria has one of the most advanced nuclear-science programmes in the Arab world, it does not view Iran as a threat and gives it diplomatic support, including consistently supporting Iran’s so-called ‘right’ to pursue a full nuclear fuel cycle. Yet the eventual outcome of the Iranian nuclear crisis could drive the future nuclear decisions of Algiers. In the meantime, Algeria appears intent to keep its options open with regard to enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Its stance on Iran’s claimed ‘right’ to these technologies and its president’s statements about Western pressure to accept additional non-proliferation obligations make it appear unlikely that Algeria would easily agree to forgo enrichment and reprocessing processes, regardless of whether it would actually seek to develop these technologies itself.

Turkey

A longstanding member of NATO, Turkey is formally protected by the collective security guarantee laid out in Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. The country’s ties to the West are further strengthened by its ongoing accession talks with the European Union. However, the Turks have a lingering scepticism about NATO guarantees, which they did not feel were properly honoured in the First and Second Gulf Wars. Turkey already has a substantial and long-standing nuclear infrastructure, focused on civilian nuclear research. Consequently, although Turkey is not likely to be the country most threatened by Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons, it is the Muslim neighbour most able technically to respond in kind.

GCC states

The GCC states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman) are currently undertaking a joint feasibility study into a nuclear energy programme. The UAE, has signed a nuclear framework agreement with France, signed a memorandum of understanding with the US, and published a white paper on its nuclear energy development. The proximity of the GCC states to Iran, along with the sectarian composition of their populations and their concern over Washington’s future posture in the Gulf, has made them eager both to avoid military conflict in the region and to protect themselves against a future Iranian nuclear-weapons capability. Afraid of suffering adverse consequences both if Iran and the US clash or if they reconcile, the Gulf states must balance competing influences.

Egypt

Egypt’s announcement in September 2006 that it would revive long dormant plans for nuclear power was meant both as a partial answer to its growing demand for energy and as an expression of national pride. Egypt did not seek nuclear weapons in response to Israel’s programme, and it certainly is not a foregone conclusion that it will do so in response to Iran’s. If any country in the region were to follow Iran in developing a latent nuclear weapons capability, however, Egypt may be the most likely candidate.