General Musharraf’s claim that there is no movement of terrorists across the Line of Control is hardly credible. His proposal for international monitoring is an ingenious method of obfuscating the critical issues. It is a fact that in spite of deployment of a large force, India has not been able to effectively seal infiltration.
The reasons are two: the constant support by Pakistan to train, arm and facilitate the movement of jehadi fighters across the borders, and secondly, the difficulties of monitoring the mountainous terrain of J&K which limits the distance to which naked eye can see in clear visibility. Clouds, rain, snow and night all add to the handicaps. The sheer magnitude of the task can be gauged from the fact that monitoring has to cover over 900 kilometres of border.
The permanent answer to the challenge of cross-border infiltration of terrorists would be a change of policy in Pakistan. There is intense pressure by India and the international community for Pakistan to do this.
Even if Islamabad sincerely implements the change, it would take quite a long time for its effects to be felt in the shape of reduced terrorism in the state. It is not clear how any joint patrolling by India and Pakistan would produce any credible results. This approach had been tried during the late 1980s with respect to infiltration across the border in Punjab. But its failure finally convinced New Delhi to go in for a permanent 1,100-km long triple-security fence floodlit at night. This helped in bringing cross-border terrorism in Punjab to an end.
The problem is that the terrain in J&K does not allow such a fence to be built. And even in the Pathankot-Jammu area, where it is possible, Pakistani firing will obstruct the construction work. To start with, Pakistan should allow a fence to be constructed if it is serious about stopping infiltration. But for most of the Line of Control, the only permanent solution is to rely on technology. And this is where the US could be helpful. Border monitoring technologies were developed to deal with the Viet Cong movement through the jungles of Viet Nam/Cambodia in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Further developments have taken place since then. The US and Israel use remote sensing technologies based on infrared optical and other sensors. These need to be inserted rapidly into the region. Local manufacture by private enterprises could speed up the process providing an added bonus to Indo-US co-operation.
Above all, the greatest advantage would be the empirical data generated in the process. This could then be discussed in flag meetings by the army commanders of both sides.