Means other than war

One of the reasons why India did not take such a drastic action was the misplaced hope that the US would be able and willing to put pressure on Pakistan to end cross-border terrorism. New Delhi has wisely concluded that Washington is either unable or unwilling to do what was expected of it. It has also realised that it was rather unrealistic on its part to have expected too much from Washington and that almost invariably there is a divide between rhetoric and action in the case of all governments and that in any case despite the noises about a unipolar world the sole super power is not omnipotent.

There are other reasons too for the rather mild reaction to the outrage. There was a belief that Musharraf needed more time to make good the promises given to India through the US. That belief also has proved wrong.

What should India do now? Assuming that India is able and willing to initiate hostilities and to sustain operations as long as necessary till Pakistan is compelled to give a commitment to stop cross-border terrorism, the moot question is: Would it be wise on India’s part to initiate a war? Before answering this question, it is important to be clear about the war aims. India is not after territory, though some adjustments of the Line of Control might be desirable from a defence point of view.

Partition is an accomplished fact and no Indian is insane enough to want to undo it or even to capture a part of Pakistan proper. Therefore, the capture of territory and taking of prisoners of war are only means to an end. In other words, India should be able to inflict on Pakistan such a massive military defeat as at the time of the Bangladesh War. Is there any realistic chance that India will be able to administer such a massive defeat on Pakistan? Once again, let us assume that India has the conventional superiority to do the job. A question arises, what will Pakistan’s reaction be to a series of military reverses? Recent revelations about the moves by Pakistan to get its nuclear arsenal ready for use at the time of Kargil and Clinton’s confrontation with Nawaz Sharif on the matter are to be taken seriously, though it goes without saying that the timing of the revelations has an obvious motivation. The ground reality is that with the nuclearisation of the subcontinent, India’s conventional superiority has been irretrievably neutralised. It does not follow that India’s pursuit of nuclear power was a mistake. There has been some glib talk in Delhi about ‘calling the bluff of Pakistan’. The argument has been advanced that applying the rational actor theory, Pakistan will not initiate a nuclear exchange for the reason that it knows of India’s ability to carry out a devastating second strike.

We should also realise that in the military realm threats have a self-fulfilling character about them. What is more frightening is that the flying time between India and Pakistan is only three to five minutes. Even a mistaken assessment on either side of a launch by the other can act as a trigger for an unintended exchange.

Therefore, once the hostilities start, Pakistan will send signals of the nuclear fuse running out, especially if it loses rapidly. Since India would have disregarded America’s clear advice and warning in initiating the hostilities, one should expect the Security Council to be summoned to pass a resolution under Chapter VII, calling on the two sides to effect an immediate ceasefire and to withdraw to pre-hostilities positions, along with a direction to the Secretary General to assist the two countries to resolve their differences through peaceful dialogue. Under such a scenario, Pakistan will be the gainer even after losing the war. Quite apart from the likely intervention through the Security Council, India should realise that the US, China and the Islamic powers will not permit Pakistan to be humiliated militarily beyond a point. India cannot also count on a Russian veto.

Does it mean that India is without any good options? No. It is time India examined its whole policy towards Pakistan for the last four decades. It is as clear as daylight that the policy has not delivered the intended results. Why? India never had a holistic approach towards its neighbour. India and Pakistan are neighbours; the neighbours can live either as good neighbours or as bad ones. India should give an ultimatum to Pakistan to make a choice. If there is no response, India should cut off diplomatic relations and abrogate the Indus Water Treaty. There will be an uproar and India will be charged with reneging on an international treaty.

The answer should be that India has always respected international law; but where is it written that life-supporting water should flow from India to Pakistan even as life-destroying terrorism flows in the reverse direction? In any case, the abrogated treaty can be restored once Pakistan shows willingness to act as a good neighbour. As of now, there is no powerful domestic lobby in Pakistan for good neighbourly relations with India. The abrogation of the treaty will create such a lobby.

The writer retired as India’s ambassador to Italy