Let’s take it from there

In its foreign and domestic policies, Pakistan was hitched to a two-horsed chariot: Nationhood based on Islam and the expectation of preferential military and economic indulgence from the West. Pakistan banked on the western revulsion over the pro-Soviet tilt of India’s non-alignment. The breakaway of Bangladesh was a setback as it demonstrated that religious faith was an insufficient cement for disparate nationhood. Subsequently ties with India stabilised for a decade but, in the Reagan presidency, Pakistan welcomed being a “frontline state” against the Evil Empire and helped the CIA assemble Islamic fundamentalists to battle the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. After both superpowers withdrew, leaving the country in chaos, Pakistan armed and tutored the Taliban for the conquest, but it ran up against dogged resistance of the Northern Alliance.

September 11 came as a godsend rescue for an economically ‘failing’ Pakistan. Musharraf enthusiastically joined USA’s war on terror, jettisoning the Taliban. Battling the Al-Qaeda in return for sanctions being lifted looked like an attractive bargain. Pakistan presumed the US had the fire power and sagacity to succeed swiftly. Vajpayee had made his own political somersault in Islamabad in 1978, when he acknowledged India’s stake in Pakistan’s security and viability. In 1999, he reaffirmed it before the Minar-e-Pakistan and, in 2003, he once against extended his hand of friendship at Srinagar.

The world, of course, recognises that the US is the most powerful economy in the world, with the largest markets. The Coalition forces mopped up Saddam Hussein’s army in three weeks but, instead of rejoicing in being liberated from an oppressive dictatorship, the Iraqis defiantly harassed the alien presence. Meanwhile, in Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai is still not in full control. This is actually worse than Vietnam because a billion-plus people in 44 countries now look upon US as the enemy of Islam.

The limitations of political ambidexterity finally became plain to Musharraf by December and Pakistan’s military operations against those viewed as religious icons became an embarrassment. Musharraf, now looked upon as an American lackey, was himself being targeted for elimination. Being conferred the status of a non-Nato ally was transparently a bribe to invigorate the campaign against Osama bin Laden and also to effectively plug the private trading of nuclear centrifuges, which had subverted America’s non-proliferation goals. America was also obviously impatient for ‘results’ to bolster the Bush presidential campaign. At the same time, it could not escape Musharraf that the ‘Pakistani’ people had become more virulently anti-American than even anti-Indian.

India showed unexpected sensitivity to Pakistan’s developing dilemma. It did not even revel in A.Q. Khan’s confessions. In a significant gesture, Musharraf made public the fact that Vajpayee had wished him health and safety before departing from Islamabad. While efforts at imposing democracy in Iraq were faltering, in Kashmir through fair elections a grassroot leadership had gathered credibility resulting in the insurgency being strikingly reduced. Then came the India-Pakistan cricket series. Even the officialdom in India was taken aback by people’s enthusiasm for the resumption of subcontinental cricketing ties. The logic of economic and human complementaries were now being openly explored. The obstructions to human, sporting, economic and cultural contacts were now widely recognised as irrational. Put together, all these trends showed an unprecedented yearning for peace and normalcy, bolstering hopes for a negotiated end to an old hostility.

Pakistan had never before anticipated the irrevocably antagonistic contradictions between Islam and the West. September 11 and the Iraq fiasco have demonstrated vividly the atrophy of military power when confronting fearless, non-uniformed nationalistic defiance. Musharraf could not be certain that the discipline and morale of his army would not be contaminated by anti-Americanism. It was, therefore, not surprising that — rejecting outside ‘facilitation’ and avoiding risks of being cornered into a dangerous conflict carrying the peril of uncertain escalation — he wisely chose beneficial bilateralism with India.

The Good Friday agreement in Ireland was a comparable step toward subsuming centuries of old hatred. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall also dramatically signified the paralysis of coercive power and the rationale of economic improvement with neighbours. Pakistan obviously cannot displease the Americans but it cannot also now publicly acclaim that it marches to Washington’s drumbeat.

India — regardless of a new dispensation being in power — must unhesitatingly continue to show a selfish and selfless stake in Pakistan’s search for modernisation and viability. Progress may be slow or, if husbanded by both sides, accelerated, but the India-Pakistan trend toward normalisation is irreversible.

Statesmanship — as the Pakistani editor Najam Sethi has urged — must lead to unlearning much history. If we do, India-Pakistan could set another example of 21st century conflict resolution.