Leadership for the 21st-century military

The importance of long-term defence planning and catering for future needs is obvious, although it does not get the type of attention it deserves. For example, while the failures of 1962 can be ascribed to lack of experience in higher command and the degeneration of our higher defence organisation that had functioned so efficiently in the 1947-48 war, more recent examples prove the point.

By 1983 it was clear that the situation in Sri Lanka may necessitate military intervention if the domestic violence continued to exacerbate. After all, we had gone to the aid of Sri Lanka at the request of its government with military forces during 1971. One does not know how much synergy existed between our diplomacy and defence capability. But we were apparently unprepared militarily for the intervention when it came in 1987. As the fighting between the LTTE and the Indian Peace Keeping Force erupted, we even found that the weapons and systems with the LTTE were superior to those of the Indian Army! And our diplomatic mission in Colombo had to resort to some innovative procedures to get better systems for our troops.

Or if we look at the two-decade-old war through terrorism that Pakistan has been waging, it does seem strange that we were not even clear how to apply military force for punitive actions when it became necessary in 2001-02. And the long three weeks for mobilisation from ‘‘cold start’’ is the least part of the problem.

The larger issue is how to apply force without obvious risks of escalation to nuclear weapon exchange level. There are few discussions and even fewer studies on the subject. On the other hand, expert studies point out that time has acquired the status of a fifth dimension of war and the ability to manage and control it to one’s own advantage would be the biggest challenge for leadership in the future. The term RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) has become a buzzword and its implications need constant assessment in our environment.

Our military forces are one of the most professional and well-trained as the US military has been realising after the series of joint exercises. So what is that we should be focusing on for shaping the military leadership for the 21st century? Obviously more training in the basic profession of fighting and handling weapons and small units, and doing it in coordination between the services, would remain a central. The future leadership needs would require fighter leaders at junior levels who would be able to shoulder greater responsibility and are capable of autonomous decision-making at increasingly rapid speed under complex and highly demanding conditions. Hence the need for less and less of ‘‘supervision’’ and greater decision-making by junior officers.

But we need to make a distinction between training and education: the former inculcates how to do things, while the latter must focus on how to think about what is to be done. What is needed, especially for higher-level leadership education, is to reinforce the training.

Leadership attributes at the higher levels pose a somewhat different challenge. Junior fighter leaders have to lead and fight; the senior military leadership must think of the future needs of the country’s defence and how military power is to be built and employed at a future date. In other words, grasp the implications of trends in military technology, doctrine and weapon systems in a given environment. They have to take crucial decisions on procurement of weapons that would have to be used for the next three decades; and their decisions on manpower would affect the country’s defence for decades. So what is needed is training, but also much more of education—that is, how to think and plan for the future—for leadership at higher levels.

Actual war experience is obviously a good school in which to train as well educate. But we are in an era of peacetime military that must perform to perfection from a ‘‘cold start’’. This can only be done by encouraging studies and research in military and strategic affairs, essentially in autonomous think tanks established for this purpose and manned by serving, retired military officers and civilian academics, both within the defence establishment as well as outside it, which produce professional literature available to a large readership, both civil and military. The US has research think tanks with every military training establishment. In fact the National Defence University has three training institutions, but eight research think tanks in it covering various political-strategic and military issues. It is not surprising that as part of its military modernisation drive, China has borrowed heavily from the US in this field.

Unfortunately we have not placed sufficient emphasis on education in military strategic issues. Defence Services find it difficult to spare officers for research and studies sanctioned in the cadre by the government for study leave related to professional studies. There seems to be reluctance bordering on antipathy to allow (leave alone encourage) intellectual studies to develop the military mind and research on matters military. Intellectual activity does not seem to rate high in the priorities. The imperatives of military leadership for the 21st century require that we pay greater attention to their education with a multi-disciplinary approach.

PART I

PART II

PART III

PART IV