‘Hindu-only approach will ensure dynasty remains alive’

The paper, which categorically rubbishes the view that the BJP lost the 2004 elections because of alienation of its core ‘‘Hindu’’ voters, assumes significance because Kulkarni is not just one of the many ‘‘intellectuals’’ who presented papers at the Bhopal meet but has been the speech-writer and ideological aide to both Atal Behari Vajpayee when he was prime minister and to L.K. Advani in his current term as BJP president.

Of even greater significance is that Kulkarni’s formulations—on the BJP’s so-called ‘‘Hindu’’ vote, on Gujarat, on Ayodhya, and most importantly on the need to ‘‘reach out to common Muslim masses’’—clearly influenced some of Vajpayee’s moves while he led the NDA government and are now guiding Advani’s attempts to cast himself and his party in a ‘‘moderate’’ mould.

During the Lok Sabha election last summer in UP, for instance, Vajpayee actively wooed the Muslim populace and the BJP, for the first time, extensively used Urdu in its campaign. Kulkarni was responsible for that decision and constantly monitored Vajpayee’s campaign at the time.

Similarly, Advani’s painstaking efforts to project a moderate and secular image during his recent visit to Pakistan was also part of the Kulkarni blue-print that the Big Two of the BJP seem to have accepted despite stiff opposition from the rest of the Sangh Parivar including large sections of the BJP.

In his paper presented at the Bhopal meet, Kulkarni—who started out as a CPI(M) fellow-traveller before joining the BJP in the early 1990s—made the following major points:

• That there was no nationwide ‘‘Hindu disquiet’’ with the BJP that led to its electoral defeat. There may have been disquiet among a section of Hindus but ‘‘that section is so small that by itself it can neither vote the BJP to power, nor dislodge the BJP from power.’’

• Even that small section of Hindus ‘‘would be chasing a chimera if they thought that a ‘critical mass’ of Hindus would some day bring a ‘‘Hindu political party’’ to power in India on a ‘‘Hindu political agenda.’’ ‘‘Apart from the impossibility of achieving this task, what should be noted is that this task is also undemocratic and not in the interests of the nation.’’

• ‘‘We may not like it, but here is the INESCAPABLE TRUTH OF INDIAN DEMOCRACY—at best, the BJP will remain one of the most important poles in Indian politics and, at worst, it will become a slightly larger version of the Hindu Mahasabha. But, with a narrow Hindu-only approach, never will it occupy the dominant position in Indian politics that the Congress once enjoyed…. In fact, this narrow approach is the surest way of allowing the Nehru-Indira-Rajiv-Sonia-Rahul dynasty to remain alive, and as a dominant player, in Indian politics.’’

• That the best option to resolve the Ayodhya dispute is a mutual settlement through talks between representatives of the Hindu and Muslim communities. ‘‘However, hopes of such a purposive dialogue were considerably jolted by the communal violence in Gujarat in 2002. It is not out of place to mention here that the communal violence in Gujarat hardened the Supreme Court’s attitude towards the Ayodhya issue when the ‘Shila Puja’ campaign was undertaken. This closed even the small window of opportunity that Atalji’s government had for making any kind of executive move in the Ayodhya matter.’’

• But the question we should honestly ask ourselves is: Was enough done to control the violence that took place after Godhra?…Quite apart from the vilification campaign carried out by our opponents, hasn’t Gujarat—and the irresponsible statements made by some self-styled Hindu leaders devoid of ‘vani sanyam’—sullied the image of the Hindu movement, both within India and abroad?

• That the BJP must settle ‘‘two fundamental questions’’ that are ‘‘at the heart of all the challenges and opportunities before us’’: Are we for or against secularism? And are we doing enough to practice even what we ourselves say is genuine secularism —namely, ‘sarva panth sambhav’?

The bulk of the paper is a passionate argument in favour of secularism and for respect and goodwill towards all ‘‘non-Hindu faiths, especially Islam.’’ Turning Advani’s pet 1980s slogan on its head, Kulkarni asks, ‘‘If we are sincere about ‘Justice for All but Appeasement of None’, isn’t there a crying need for a non-appeasement approach to the welfare and development of the poor among non-Hindus, especially Muslims?’’

Underlining that a pro-Muslim approach also made eminent political sense, Kulkarni writes: ‘‘By now every objective election analysis has established, without the thinnest shadow of doubt, that with zero or insignificant support of our Muslim brethren, no political party in India can aspire to have a majority of its own in Parliament. And should a party like the BJP ever come to power in alliance with other parties, we’d be living in a fool’s paradise if we thought that we can retain power from one election to another, by ignoring Muslims altogether.’’

The choice, Kulkarni asserts, is clear—a secular approach that ensures BJP remains an important pole in Indian politics or a narrow ‘‘Hindu-only approach’’ that makes it ‘‘a slightly larger version of the Hindu Mahasabha.’’

The battle between the two options, as the turmoil in the Sangh Parivar following Advani’s Pakistan sojourn testifies, is nowhere near resolution.