The Supreme Court has held that high courts have no power to commute a sentence awarded to a person found guilty of committing any offence and said that the government, too, cannot commute sentences at its sweet will, pleasure, whim or fancy.Taking exception to a Delhi HC order asking government to commute a sentence awarded to a person in a food adulteration case, a tqo-member bench said that discretion to commute a sentence rests with the government and it was not for the high court to order the same.On exercise of the power conferred on the government under Section 433 of the CrPC, the bench said: ‘‘The appropriate government may not, as a matter of routine course, indulge in exercise of such power at its sweet will, pleasure and whim or fancy.’’The bench said the government while exercising its powers under Sec 433 had to keep in mind ‘‘the reasons germane and relevant for purpose of law under which sentence had been imposed, commiserative facts necessitating the commutation, and interests of society and public interest.’’Appearing for the government, Solicitor General Harish Salve had contended that the High Court could not order for the commutation of the sentence, once the conviction of the person had been upheld.He had argued that the offence of food adulteration was a social evil and when the legislature had mandated a minimum sentence for a given violation, it would not be proper for ordering commutation resulting in circumvention of legislative intention.‘‘Orders of this nature passed in large numbers in Delhi and all over in the country are said to be causing a severe impediment in the effective enforcement of provisions of the Act to curb the social evil, having further wide ramifications on the society,’’ it said.The apex court bench said: ‘‘So far as the case in hand is concerned, not only the high court has decided to commute but issued a mandatory direction to the government with no discretion or liberty left with it, except to formalise the same, on payment of the fine amount specified by the court.’’He said: ‘‘This is nothing but assuming powers where there are none for the High Court and where the statute concerned specifically entrusts it only to the appropriate government.’’However, the bench said when such discretionary powers were vested with the government, its responsibility becomes all that greater and the powers ‘‘may have to be exercised with great circumspection.’’Otherwise, legislative intention would become a mere dead-letter at the whim of the executive, it said.
