Give credit where it’s due

Faith in, and rising expectations from, a "stable" and "powerful" leadership is understandable in South Asia where nationalist leaders and their political and intellectual legacy continues to influence public opinion and decision making. In India, it is increasingly clear that the Congress leadership represented a wider range of interests, and that its social composition and political aims were more heterogeneous, than either the British or some historians dominated by the official mind have argued.

The performance of the Congress Ministries from 1937 to 1939 illustrates that the ministers adopted their party’s political and economic programme even at the risk of alienating their powerful allies. In fact, the limited repertoire of the Congress, which inhibited the party from reaching outto the masses, was vastly enlarged with the Mahatma launching the Rowlatt Satyagraha in 1919. From then on, the Congress did not ask for dominion status but demanded complete independence. It did not seek concessions for only the elites, but developed an agenda with national aspirations.

Doubtless some policies and programmes were diluted to meet political exigencies, but this was not unexpected for a party without revolutionary or socialistic pretensions. The important point is that the Congress was able to build a consensual base for itself, a fact that has been crucial for its own success as well as that of Indian democracy. Equally, it brought together a cross-section of intellectuals, all of whom contributed in varying degrees to the formulation of its agenda. Thus it was the socialists who drafted the Fundamental Rights Resolution as well as the party’s 1936 agrarian programme. Similarly, the communists’ efforts resulted in the wider participation of trade unions, peasants’ and other organisations.

The unfinished agenda of the Congress Ministries was taken up after independence. Measures such as the abolition of zamindari in Uttar Pradesh were pushed through by Nehru’s government in the 1950s. A democratic and secular Constitution, the hallmark of India’s tryst with destiny, was adopted after partition. Although the Congress was beset with problems and sections of its leadership uncomfortable with some of Nehru’s ideas, the spirit guiding the architects of the Constitution has served India well.

The Indian experiment stands in contrast to developments in neighbouring Pakistan. India went on to consolidate itself as a democracy whereas Pakistan fell prey to military rule in 1958. The Congress, a major catalyst in India’s political and social transformation, survived as a powerful organisation while the Muslim League, torn by dissent, lacking an articulate agenda and effective organisational structure, failed to institutionalise itself or provide the leadership essential for underwriting stability or democracy in Pakistan. The ideological cement that held it together dissolved once Pakistan was achieved. The Muslim League, the prime casualty of partition, declined after Jinnah’s death.

Whereas the Congress took the lead in creating a democratic and secular polity, Pakistan’s political elites had no blueprint for, or shared vision of, a modern state. In an area where religious passions had been heightened in the previous decade to create a Muslim homeland, Jinnah’s belated plea for a secular society failed to strike a chord. The Jamaat-i-Islami, wedded to Islamic theocracy, was ready to seize power to enforce the Shariat.

Historian Ayesha Jalal begins her book with an important question: why have the experiences of India, Pakistan and Bangladesh been so different since independence? Surely part of the explanation lies in the character of leadership in these countries. India without Nehru and the Congress party would have faced serious problems of national reconstruction. It would have been torn by regional, linguistic and religious and communal dissension. Nehru, with all his failures and shortcomings, steered the Indian ship through the rough currents of history. His greatest asset was his commitment to parliamentary democracy, socialism and secularism. And his principal contribution, which needs serious recognition, was to lay down the foundations of a modern scientific and liberal society.

If Nehru’s blueprint is contested today, the prime responsibility rests with the Congress which, apart from abandoning its own socio-economic goals, abdicated its historic role when the Babri Masjid was destroyed. It has since failed to harness its own ideological resources to mobilise the minorities, backward castes and Dalits. The leadership, despite its rhetoric, is fragmented, bereft of ideas and ill-equipped to cope with the changing political landscape. Slowly but steadily, the Congress has lost the initiative in areas where for decades it enjoyed power and legitimacy.

The election results may bring a few surprises. Yet the marginalisation of a national party may not be compatible with the country’s secular and democratic traditions. For one, the need of the hour is the Congress’s revival in its traditional strongholds and a more enduring realignment of liberal and left elements to thwart anti-liberal and non-secular ideologies.

India’s history, Sunil Khilnani points out, has shown two broad possibilities of dealing with diversities: a pluralist or an exclusive approach. The voters have the responsibility to choose between them. They must decide what they wish to build out of the wreckage at Ayodhya.