
Reversing the decades-old jehadi culture of Pakistan would no doubt take time. But it would be a gross error to believe that Pakistan will not be able to reverse jehadi terrorism, especially that propagated across the borders because of domestic opposition to or due to inadequate control over the jehadis.
But those who put together the institution of jehadi terrorism for political purposes know how best to dismantle them, if they want to do so. At no stage has General Musharraf expressed his inability to control terrorism. There is also no evidence of the 8220;perilous price8221; he is supposed to have paid for co-operating with the US. The issue, therefore, is more of Pakistan8217;s willingness to control terrorism rather than its ability to do so.
Jack Straw would also do well to note the growing disillusionment in India about the western powers8217; commitment to the war against terrorism beyond their narrow national agendas. Serious questions have also been raised as to why India should have to depend upon the US and the UK to make Islamabad change its destructive policies. This is eroding the confidence in international diplomacy to produce the desired results, and consequently increasing the belief that India would have to go it alone.
As it is, the IMF, Paris Club and other western financial institutions continue to subsidise Pakistan8217;s defence budget in the name of supporting its weak economy and as a reward for co-operation in the war against terrorism. But this subsidy in reality also reduces Pakistan8217;s net cost of military confrontation and possible war.
It is, therefore, not surprising to find Musharraf being so dismissive of the military deployments on the borders in the context of which he was threatening nuclear weapons only the other day.