Fragments of a Common Past

Imperialism in retreat has always been a messy affair, with former colonies inevitably left with a pile of debris, unresolved questions and contested boundaries, and a trail of blood and tragedy. Britain’s retreat from India was no exception in spite of the struggle for independence having been conducted through non-violent strategies. The greatest price was paid by two provinces, Punjab and Bengal, whose political leadership did not want partition, provinces which despite being Muslim majority did not elect Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s Muslim League to power till a year before transfer of power. Both provinces suffered later again; East Bengal reeling under the genocide of 1970-71 at the hands of the Pakistan army opted for independence, dealing a deathblow to the questionable two-nation theory. And East Punjab suffered for a decade under cross-border terrorism from Pakistan during 1983-93.

Panigrahi painstakingly puts together the historical details of more than a quarter century relying on a large number of new sources collected in the United Kingdom and India to construct his picture; and it is not a pretty picture. It is not as if Britain accepted retreat as inevitable. Even in 1943 Lord Linlithgow, the viceroy, believed that the British Raj would continue for “another 30 years” and encouraged Jinnah in his demands. Panigrahi concludes that while the partition of India was not inevitable, the process had reached a turning point by November 1939 when Linlithgow and Jinnah working in tandem “devised a plan of action, subsequently leading to the historic Pakistan resolution of March 1940 passed by the All India Muslim League at Lahore”. Worse was to follow with Linlithgow’s successor, Lord Wavell, harbouring a deep distrust of the Indian National Congress. Winston Churchill told Wavell in 1945 to “keep a bit of India” which in a way became Pakistan!

Jinnah, a non-practising Muslim, insisted that he was the sole spokesman for the Muslims, and the Muslim League was the sole representative of all Muslims in India. But the League could not form a government in any Muslim majority province through elections. As regards the religious credentials of the Muslim League, Maulana Maududi, the Jamait-i-Islami leader (who became one the leading Islamic ideologues), observed in 1943: “From the League’s Quaid-i-Azam down to the humblest leader there was none who could be credited with an Islamic outlook.” The author concludes, “Religion essentially served as a means to achieve a political end.”

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The Muslim League’s support base even in the years after the Pakistan Resolution of March 1940 remained poor till the emotive slogan of “Islam in danger” galvanised the people.

The League emerged as the single largest party in Bengal only in 1946, a decade after elected governments had become the norm in the provinces. In Sindh, which had a 74 per cent Muslim population, the League could never muster a majority. Assam was similar. Punjab continued to be ruled by the National Unionist Party which kept rejecting the League and its philosophy till a year before partition. The North West Frontier Province was never ruled by the League.

Panigrahi concludes that the Muslim minority province of UP became critical to partition, including on the language issue. Jinnah’s Muslim League remained opportunistic, supporting abolition of zamindari in East Bengal where the majority of large landholders were non-Muslims, and opposing its abolition in UP. In a similar vein Jinnah had insisted that the princely ruler’s decision must be final (and not the will of the people) but Pakistan is still unwilling to accept J&K’s accession to India.