Five years after Pokharan II

There is little doubt that we have sufficient quantity of nuclear warheads and fissile material to make more, with yields ranging from sub-kiloton to at least 60 (possibly 100) kiloton yield. Delivery systems in the shape of strike aircraft with ranges of 400-1,000 km exist in the air force’s inventory. It is in the missile area that development needs to be expedited. We have the short range Prithvi missile which has undergone fairly extensive testing, but which is unsuitable for nuclear delivery in view of their short range. We have tested the 700-km range solid fuel missile, and testing of the 2,000-km has started. The 3,000-km missile is likely to be ready later this year. There is no doubt that we will finally have reliable ballistic missiles of requisite range and performance in spite of all roadblocks. But the reality is that a credible deterrent requires 5,000-km range solid fuel rail/road mobile intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), deployed with operational units in adequate numbers along with at least an equal number of dummy missile units for deception purposes. And this seems to be some years away.

The operational reliability of future ballistic missile deserves close attention in future. The 1,500-km Agni technology demonstrator missile had achieved a success rate of only 66 per cent which is grossly inadequate. Testing of IRBMs has been less frequent, and adequate sample is not available to make an accurate judgement of operational reliability. While the DRDO has been confident that a couple of tests are adequate for induction and operational use of ballistic missiles, the experience in other countries, where technology has been commonplace for decades, would indicate the need for a far more extensive testing schedule.

There can also no doubt that a submarine-based nuclear deterrent provides the maximum survivability to the arsenal since a nuclear-powered submarine can remain underwater for long periods. But this also poses problems of central control because of communication challenges with submerged submarines at a distance from our coast. We have yet to build our own submarine, and work on the nuclear power reactor for a submarine has been going on for quite some time. If China, which has far more experience in building ballistic missiles and submarines with a vastly larger defence industrial base, is any indication, a reliable operational nuclear-powered submarine armed with IRBMs could be two decades or more away.

So what does the overall picture amount to? In essence it implies that we have a credible nuclear deterrent capability to deliver an adequate number of nuclear warheads of desired yield over short-medium ranges available with the air force, which also has extensive experience spanning five decades in strategic strike operations. And enough would survive for a punishing retaliatory strike on the aggressor. Building land-based mobile nuclear missile delivery capability is progressing well, but could take another 5-10 years to be operationally effective. The submarine-based nuclear deterrent could be further away. Meanwhile the present capability is adequate to provide a credible deterrent against Pakistan, while the need for other contingencies is not time critical.

What we have after five years as a declared nuclear weapon state, therefore, is a credible limited deterrent. In the ultimate analysis, this capability successfully deterred Pakistan from escalating the Kargil war in 1999. It was, no doubt, clear to Islamabad that on the path to a possible escalation, the air force would dominate its conventional air power and military capabilities while the army and navy were already placed in position to impose high costs militarily if it felt compelled to expand the war—as indeed it had done in 1947 and in 1965. But at the end of that escalatory ladder Pakistan would have to face the prospect of losing major military-economic assets, forcing a situation where it would have to decide whether to reach for its nuclear button or not. At that stage, therefore, Islamabad would had to take into account Indian retaliation with nuclear weapons with the promised “unacceptable level of punishment”. Prudence demanded that it was better not to escalate in the face of Indian nuclear weapons capability. Hence Islamabad opted for the diplomatic route which required its own withdrawal, however grudgingly, and all the consequences that followed.