Daisy cutters or olive branch

A nuclear, conflict-ridden South Asia would be inimical to US long-term strategic designs, so the elevated engagement.

The thrust of US interest and physical presence has shifted to the oil-producing heartlands of Central and West Asia; stability and compliance in its immediate periphery is imperative. Operating on hostile territory Iraq, Afghanistan, West Asia demands diffusing conflict in other high-risk regions 8212; a road map for a Palestinian state, talks with North Korea in China, facilitation in the intractable nuclear subcontinent.

A conflict-free South Asia would complete the 8220;southern encirclement8221; jigsaw with the ultimate eye on the prized Caspian oil. Resolution of an otherwise contentious issue in the region would choke the communication conduit of 8220;terrorist networks8221;, eliminating their spawning pads and, more importantly, averting the transfer of nuclear technology to rogue elements.

Besides the broader frame of regional containment and military-economic interest, these immediate factors have evoked heightened focus on the region. Vajpayee8217;s hand of friendship is in fact fine-tuning to these evolving realities.

India needs to take it on from here, employing a proactive policy exuding confidence and strength. The decision to revive communication links and appoint a high commissioner to Pakistan was opportune, as was the caution displayed in identifying the need for ground work before plunging into any bilateral activity.

But India needs to be more receptive to the fact that engagement is the only recourse. It tried coercion and failed, for whatever reasons. With the added dimension of the global pharaoh 8212; oops, liberator 8212; in the fray with proven 8220;disciplinarian8221; credentials, it has no choice.

In this regard both India and Pakistan will have to shed their maximalist positions and be prepared to meet half way, more so because of the failure of these positions to facilitate any settlement 8212; be it the harping on Security Council resolutions without fulfilling its preliminary conditions, pulling back of forces from the region, or the obduracy of working within the ambit of the Shimla agreement as a tactic to repel multilateral involvement without taking up the Kashmir issue in its bilateral exchanges.

Besides being the bigger and more stable party to the issue, India would have to show additional patience, bordering on magnanimity, on another count 8212; its relatively higher stakes. Unlike Pakistan, India has an expanding economy, to some extent an integrated civil society, stable institutions and people-centric governance, aiming at a place on the high table of global politerati.

All these credentials modulate a distraction-free paradigm enabling it to focus singularly on building its 8220;Great India8221; dream. Pakistan, sadly, has interest vested in the perpetuation of the conflict, to its own internal detriment. Where it doesn8217;t foster dreams of grandeur, a militarily engaged India is kept bogged down and the myth of its nonpareil army allowed to inflate with a caustic spillover, both internally and on the entire region. The course is open to India, whether to opt for a win-win situation or an ominously lose-lose scenario.

While branding Pakistan as an extremist whole, India needs to gauge that if distorted extremism has wreaked havoc in Kashmir, the picture is no different in Pakistan. These minority extremist forces in Pakistan are undermining its national integration and are as mortally opposed to liberal opinion within Pakistan as they are to 8220;infidel8221; India.

Unnecessary obduracy will only strengthen these elements, weakening liberal forces 8212; India8217;s prospective partners. India must also avoid dismissing steps by Pakistan as not enough and discern the exigencies created by these elements. India will have to tread very cautiously, displaying tremendous perseverance step through step in strengthening these liberal forces and loosening the extremist noose around Pakistan8217;s policymaking apparatus.

Trust me, there are enough sane elements within Pakistan who see the futility of costs of the whole exercise and yearn for the fulfillment of Pakistan8217;s enormous 8220;constructive8221; potential.

Before 8220;officially8221; reaching out to Pakistan, ground work on the domestic front will have to be undertaken. Presently there is no consensus beyond the immediate goalpost of an end to 8220;cross-border terrorism8221; 8212; what after that? India will have to delineate a clear, unambiguous and realistic set of flexible objectives transcending party interests. Jingoism-fed public opinion will have to be conditioned, orthodox elements tamed but, above all, it will have to prepare for probable pain and loss, which will be mutual with Pakistan.

In Kashmir India will have to identify serious interlocutors with the simplistic, yet by far most credible, touchstone of interest in peace vs interest in perpetuation of violence. No doubt, opinion amongst these select 8220;partners in peace8221; will not be identical to New Delhi8217;s; however, mutually beneficial meeting grounds can be ascertained.

Finally, there is no need for India to shy away from third-party facilitation. After internationally 8220;accredited8221; elections in Kashmir, a substantive strategic relationship with the West, on the right side of the 8220;terrorist8221; conduit and relatively shared values and interests, India has nothing to lose. It can8217;t continue celebrating its democracy and deny a people their intrinsic right. Both India and Pakistan will have to give peace another chance8230; or else, face the daisy cutters.

The writer is a Srinagar-based security expert and wife of Hurriyat leader, Sajjad Lone