It is now almost 25 years since the Indian Coast Guard was formed. Instituted in 1978, this maritime organisation was conceived on the lines of a para military force functioning under the Ministry of Defence (MoD) though its funding came from the Ministry of Finance. There were good reasons for this. Unlike the land borders where sectoral responsibilities can be more easily demarcated between agencies like the Army and BSF, the sea does not permit such delineation. Close interface was, therefore, essential between the Navy and Coast Guard, possible only under the MoD. As for funding, its main function of preventing poaching and smuggling in our waters lay within the domain of the MoD. This arrangement also ensured that the MoD’s budget didn’t appear to be overloaded. When the Coast Guard was formed, the security scenario was still relatively uncomplicated. During peacetime, the main task of the armed force was to prepare for war. Other, more mundane tasks could be done by others including the para military. Thus, the Army could leave much of the peacetime activity spectrum to the BSF and the ITBP. The Navy, though, had no such structures to fall back on. Every activity at sea, be it search and rescue, pollution control or smuggling, came under its purview. Not only did these impinge upon its primary task of preparing for war, such tasks were also seen as infra dig. It, therefore, actively supported the formation of the Coast Guard, even transferring some of its older and smaller ships to the fledgling force. This small force has since grown into a reasonably credible maritime service operating large and medium size patrol vessels and inshore patrol craft supported by Dornier aeroplanes and shipborne helicopters. It operates from three regional headquarters in Mumbai, Chennai and Fort Blair and smaller district centres. The line between war and peacetime has blurred. Ship hijacking, gun running, drug smuggling are giving a new dimension to security threats at sea, as seen in the bomb blasts in Mumbai. Policing activities at sea need a response similar to the war on land At the same time, the situation at sea has changed dramatically. Just as on our borders, the demarcation between war and peacetime has blurred. Piracy, hijacking of ships, gun running and drug smuggling — interlinked and interdependent — are giving a new dimension to security threats at sea and this brand of terrorism is now impacting, directly and indirectly, terrorism on land. This was visibly highlighted during the 1993 bomb blasts in Mumbai, when almost all the RDX was brought across the sea and smuggled into the country through ports on the west coast. Similarly, but for the ingress of arms from across the sea, the LTTE in Sri Lanka would not have become the force that it is. More low profile policing will not be able to combat them effectively as was seen last year in the seizure of the hijacked Japanese vessel MV Alondra Rainbow off our west coast. Increasingly, Navies across the world are realising that policing activities during peacetime require a warlike dimension and a response similar to the proxy war on land. They cannot afford to lie back and disclaim responsibility for what happens at sea on the plea that their accountability begins only in war. Just as the Army bears the brunt of the proxy war on land, so has the Navy to be the prime authority to shoulder the burden at sea. The sea is an indivisible medium, not susceptible to sectoral demarcation. Unity of action and command is essential as also single point accountability. Cooperation between agencies can be helpful only upto a point. Without clear accountability, performance is certain to be sub-optimal and may, often, not be commensurate with resources. This issue was discussed, in passing, by a task force constituted to review higher defence management. On its recommendation, the Group of Ministers directed that funding for the Coast Guard should, henceforth, form part of the defence budget. This has been an important step in the right direction: with this change, the Coast Guard is an owned and controlled wing of the MoD. It is now necessary to carry this process to its logical conclusion and to place all of the ministry’s maritime responsibilities under its main sea going force, the Navy. Just as the Coast Guard operates under Naval control in war, so must it be operated in peace. The MoD has no second land or air force in its charge, and there’s no reason why the same logic should not apply to its maritime wing. Once command and control of the Coast Guard is assigned to the Navy, it must then be responsible and accountable for everything that happens at sea in peace as much as in war. Another benefit which will accrue from the proposed change will be economy in expenditure. The considerable duplication in facilities which has taken place in administrative, operational and maintenance infrastructure can be streamlined to result in substantial savings. Several of the Coast Guard’s headquarters—all three regional ones and many district centres—are located at places where the Navy itself operates large facilities. On a very rough calculation, annual savings of Rs 40-50 crore can be effected by making this adjustment. The argument that the Navy might give Cinderella treatment to the Coast Guard is naive and laughable. Since the Chief of the Navy would be accountable, it is hardly likely that he would ignore the work of the Coast Guard. Also, his ability to oversee operations at sea, whether in peace or in war, is much greater than that of MoD officials. From every point of view, there can be only benefits in placing the Coast Guard under the Navy. Such an arrangement will ensure optimum utilisation of resources available at sea and also permit unity in maritime operations, critical in the new security environment. (The writer is former director-general, Defence Planning Staff)
