China and the nuclear vision

A revisionist view, led by the officials of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) andother military establishments, argues that China would have to expand its nuclear weapon modernisation and undertake a moderate nuclear build-up to counter the new threat posed by India’s nuclear arsenal. They assert that by going overt India has added a new dimension to their security calculus, which can only be met by enlarging the size of the present nuclear arsenal.

A more moderate view, propounded by non-military officials and civilian strategists, however, wants China not to build up its arsenal but to maintain its current nuclear doctrine and modernisation plan. They argue that India’s nuclear weapon capability was known for decades and India having gone overt last year does not pose a higher level of threat to China than in the past.

Although the final outcome of this debate is still to be decided, the moderates’ perspective, that a "few dozen" Indian nuclear weapons are tolerable, appears to be gaining ground. They argue that China had built a limited nuclear arsenal to counter both the UnitedStates and the former Soviet Union. Hence a "few dozen" Indian nuclear weapons should be adequate to deter both the Pakistani arsenal (estimated at less than a dozen) and the Chinese arsenal (estimated to be between 300 and 500). However, Chinese moderates, such as the Shanghai-based scholar, warn that were the Indian arsenal to go over a 100 weapons it would be seen as a provocation by China and "we will have to respond (by building up the arsenal)".

Simultaneously there is also a growing perception that Beijing’s own actions in the nuclear field are likely to have a direct impact on the shape and size of the Indian (and as an extension, Pakistani) nuclear arsenal. This is significant in light of the ongoing discussions within China on how to respond to the US plans to build and deploy theatre missile defence (TMD) systems around China. One of the preferred ways to counter the proposed TMD systems would be for China to enlarge its arsenal by adding an additional 200 intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs) to its inventory. Such a build-up, Chinese scholars admit, will lead to a comparable build-up by India.

Given these factors there are several advantages for India accepting a ratio of 1:3 between the Indian and Chinese arsenal. First, it links and pegs the Indian nuclear force to China’s and therefore provides a rationale for a build-up in future. Second, this ratio is not only more favourable than the one between China and the two superpowers in the 1960s but would provide parity between India and China in the early decades of the next century.

This is particularly true given that economically resurgent China is more vulnerable and would have a lower threshold for unacceptable damage. Third, strategic con siderations apart, it would also provide a basis to carry out serious arms control negotiations with China based on specific numbers. This would provide a major fillip not only for arms control diplomacy (which has been derailed over the last few years) but also for the normalisation processbetween India and China.

Before India and China embark on this path it is important not to paint China as a monochromatic power but to discern the various shades of grey that determine Beijing’s multi-faceted policy towards India.

The writer is a Research Fellow at the Centre for International Studies, Oxford