Beyond gesture diplomacy in Nepal

There is need to initiate a broadbased inclusive political process in Nepal. Marginalised classes, and minority groups have to be empowered. But the key issue is the approach to be adopted towards the Maoists. They did play a crucial role in forcing the king to hand over power to people’s representatives. This is well documented in the report of Brussels-based International Crisis Group. They made the difference by converting a political movement into a mass uprising and still retain a lot of clout, at least in rural areas, to be able to cause regression of the country back to chaos and violence, which could give a pretext to the royalists to bounce back. Neither the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) nor the Maoists could have forced the king to concede on their own separately. It is this assessment of their own inherent limitations, which brought the two together. Their alliance was and continues to remain essentially tactical in nature. What is now needed is to nourish that and to develop the necessary trust so that both of them could work together to take Nepal forward.

India played a key role in bringing the two together by facilitating the signing of 12-point agreement between SPA and the Maoist in November 2005 in New Delhi. It is up to India once again to take the lead in keeping the two engaged so that they could jointly develop the roadmap ahead. The SPA-led government has done well by finally repealing the anti-terrorist law and freeing Maoist prisoners. This should set the right tone for its negotiations with the Maoists.

We have a strategic interest in ensuring peace and security as well as economic prosperity in that country. But our capacity to play an effective role there would depend on our ability and willingness to create a level playing field. The key issue here is of our own engagement with the Maoists.

The Maoists, though not known for their regard for democracy, have admitted to their mistakes and have shown an interest in joining the democratic political process.

We need to show self-confidence and, begin engaging the Maoists actively, particularly when they themselves appear willing to reduce their anti-India posturing. Let us face it, it i only through engagement that we can acquire some leverage with the Maoists and contribute to the building of trust. Disarming of the Maoist cadres might be a desirable objective but it would be difficult to accomplish that unless the Maoists themselves cooperate, as the experience in other theatres in the world would no doubt indicate. In the absence of requisite trust, Maoists might refuse to concede any further ground other than what they are obligated to under the 12-point agreement. That agreement refers to an understanding on keeping both the Maoists’ cadres and Nepalese army under international supervision during the elections to the constituent assembly. It may be prudent to proceed strictly in accordance with the spirit of that understanding, as introduction of new elements at this stage by either of the parties could unnecessarily complicate the situation. The Nepalese army has been put under the government control but the Maoists know it well that its traditional sympathies lie with the king. This perhaps gives rise to their apprehension of being overrun by the army once they disarm which could provide the opportunity to the king to stage a backdoor entry.

The writer is deputy director, Institute for Defence Studies & Analyses, New Delhi virendragupta@gmail.com