An endangered institution — Protect the governor

True, the President issues a warrant for their appointment. But it is the ruling party at the Centre which makes the recommendation. And both of them were present at the meeting: Congress, which has appointed 20 to 22 of the governors, and the Janata Dal, four to six.

Yet, what could they have said? They are political appointees. Some have been party leaders, who could not be adjusted elsewhere. Some are civil servants, who had served the government well; others are those who had a godfather. Even if they have some views, they seldom express them lest they should be `misunderstood’.

The governors are appointed for a tenure of five years. But they hold office “during the pleasure of the President.” In 1977, after the Emergency, the Janata Government dismissed all of them because they were the appointees of Indira Gandhi. When she returned to power in 1980 she acted in the same manner ousting the governors appointed by the Janata Government.

Over the years, the institution has got devalued. Successive governments in Delhi have used governors for their partisan purpose: to do away with the governments of the opposition. It began with Jawaharlal Nehru when he dismissed the first Communist Government in Kerala at the instance of Indira Gandhi. Some 24 governments have gone out in similar fashion. One of the last dismissals was that of the late N. T. Rama Rao’s government by the then Governor Ram Lal at the bidding of the Indira Gandhi Government.

India’s first President Rajendra Prasad anticipated the machinations of the Central Government and people’s disenchantment. In his personal diary, he wrote: “Nowadays, because of differences between the various political parties or members of the same party the people of every State are disgusted and troubled by the political situation and party politics. They do not have the same confidence in politicians as they once had. It is necessary, therefore, that the people of a State should have full confidence in a supreme non-partisan institution like that of a governor.”

The Constituent Assembly itself was conscious of the dangers if the governor was to be a government nominee. The system of nomination was generally opposed. It was felt that since there could be different parties in power at the Centre and in the State, the Prime Minister might have “his own axe to grind”. Some members supported election of governors on the ground that “an elected governor would be strong enough to save the province from groupism and factionalism.”

Some members, including B. R. Ambedkar, who piloted the Constitution, favoured nomination from a panel and argued that “a qualified nomination was a better thing than simple nomination.” Nehru, whose intervention clinched the point, said that eminent leaders of the minorities should have a chance, and simple nomination would offer them a better chance than a panel system or election. How wrong he was can be seen from the kind of men selected as governors by his successors.

The Constituent Assembly also expressed the hope that a convention of seeking the consent of the State Government concerned in the appointment of a governor would be established. This convention was there till Indira Gandhi violated it with a vengeance when she returned to power in 1980. Jagmohan was sent to Jammu and Kashmir without the consent of Farooq Abdullah, then the State Chief Minister, and A. N. Banerjee was appointed Governor of Karnataka without the consent of then State Chief Minister Ramakrishna Hegde. Buta Singh as Home Minister enunciated the thesis that New Delhi need not consult the State because a governor is the Centre’s agent in the State.

Some may argue that this is the price the country has to pay for a strong Centre. What they forget is that this is a travesty of India’s federal structure. And tinkering with the structure has already cost the country dearly. Preservation of the institution of governor means appointment of eminent persons with impeccable integrity.

No governor should be allowed to continue beyond his tenure. At present some governors have stayed for years because no successors have been nominated. This smacks of politics of favouritism. In fact, governors should insist on quitting when their tenure ends.

Coming to the President’s proposition of a hung Assembly, no party or alliance should be invited to form the government till it proves in writing how it makes a majority in the House. The claim should be verified with the parties concerned. This holds as much good for the Centre as for the states. The BJP was asked to form the government at the Centre without proving its majority even on paper.

Besides the written claim, the party or alliance should be asked to prove its majority on the floor of the House within five days. The more the leeway, the bigger is the scope for horse-trading. When in doubt, the governor should call the newly-elected House to decide which party is in a position to form the government. His judgment will always be questioned and he should avoid such situations.

The President was quite right in his opening address at the meeting that “we should make a frank appraisal of the constraints and complexities involved, and the relative merits of alternative methods of dealing with different situations as could ensure smooth and correct working of our Constitution in the most difficult scenarios.”

It is a pity that political parties indulged in generalities and did not offer any concrete suggestion. The debate should continue, across the country.