Air pirates and Pakistan

Almost four years down the road, Indian and American investigating agencies have both descended on the scene of the crime. Two DIGs of the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and a couple of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) officials visited Kandahar in late October to interrogate several former Taliban officials, including Mullah Wakil Ahmed

Muttawakil, Afghanistan’s former foreign minister who acted as interlocutor during the final stages of the hijacking.

Muttawakil was only recently released by US authorities. CBI officials sought and received permission from the Afghan government to interrogate him before proceeding to Kandahar.

Indian Airlines flight IC-814 was on its way to New Delhi from Kathmandu when five armed men commandeered it over Varanasi. They first took the plane to Amritsar and then to Lahore. After refuelling in Lahore, it took off for Dubai where 21 passengers were allowed to disembark before the plane again took to the air, this time headed for Kandahar.

An Indian national, Rupin Katyal, was murdered by the hijackers but the remaining passengers returned home safely after being held captive from December 24 to 31. They were set free in exchange for the release of three top militants, Maulana Masood Azhar, Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh and Mushtaq Zargar. Both Indian and American authorities subsequently registered separate criminal cases against the hijackers.

Following the US invasion of Afghanistan, FBI agents apparently came across taped conversations between the hijackers and air traffic control (ATC) officials in Kandahar. Some of this information was recently shared with Indian intelligence.

The FBI is said to be extending full cooperation to the CBI because an American national, Jeanne Moore, was among the passengers on that flight. After recording Moore’s testimony, FBI teams visited New Delhi on three occasions to discuss her abduction and the progress being made in the case.

The CBI, meanwhile, is particularly interested in the record of messages received by ATC Kandahar as it suspects the hijackers were receiving directives from Pakistani officials. Indian intelligence believes a log of incoming communiques will expose any and all links between the Taliban and their alleged sponsors in Pakistan.

During the hijack drama, Islamabad vehemently denied its involvement and went to the extent of offering to negotiate on New Delhi’s behalf. However, the fact remains that Abdul Rauf Asghar and Yousuf Azhar, the younger brother and brother-in-law respectively of Masood Azhar, were among the hijackers. Masood Azhar, who subsequently founded the Jaish-e-Mohammad, was soon seen leading victory processions in Pakistan.

According to well-placed Pakistani intelligence sources, the CBI informed the FBI that Muttawakil went back on several commitments made during negotiations with the hijackers, leaving then Indian foreign minister Jaswant Singh redfaced. The Indians also claimed Muttawakil was hostile during the mediation.

When Jaswant landed in Kandahar with Azhar, Sheikh and Zargar, Muttawakil assured him the hijackers and the freed militants would be held in Afghan custody until the Indians left Kandahar. However, as soon as the three Pakistani militants were handed over to the hijackers, they were provided with a vehicle in which they victoriously drove away.

The CBI believed that interrogating Muttawakil would reveal intricate details, particularly the hijackers’ alleged contacts with the outside world. During the Indo-US Joint Working Group on Terrorism meeting on July 11 and 12, 2003, in Washington, India requested permission to personally grill Muttawakil.

After being denied access by the FBI for almost two years, Indian investigators finally succeeded in questioning Muttawakil and a few other Taliban leaders. What is not known to Pakistani intelligence is whether Muttawakil merely recorded his account of the hijacking or whether he recorded a statement that could be used by the prosecution in the ongoing trial in Patiala, India.

FBI investigators appeared convinced that Muttawakil repeatedly used the ATC channel to communicate with the hijackers and Pakistani officials. Therefore he, more than any other Taliban official, the FBI conjectures, knew how the hijacking was engineered and where the people responsible, five in number, were headed after leaving Kandahar.

India insists Pakistan’s role in the hijacking should be seen in the context of a January 1, 1999, statement by Abdul Hai Mutmaeen, the official Taliban spokesman at the time, who had maintained the hijackers and freed militants were deposited on the Pak-Afghan border near Quetta.

Any evidence that links Pakistani intelligence with the IC-814 hijack could put enormous pressure on Islamabad — particularly in the wake of Washington’s decision to officially blacklist Dawood Ibrahim, the Indian underworld don who reportedly resides in Karachi.

Under the SAARC convention on extradition and mutual assistance in tackling crime, the Indian government made two formal requests for the custody of the five hijackers and their accomplices. Islamabad countered that it would itself apprehend and prosecute any suspect found within Pakistan or in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Then CBI director R.K. Raghavan raised the issue with Interpol officials during the global police association’s 69th annual conference in Athens. Soon thereafter, Interpol issued a ‘‘red-corner alert’’ against the five hijackers and two accomplices who are believed to be key conspirators.

But India’s chances of getting custody via this channel appear to be slim. According to government sources in Islamabad, even though Interpol’s warrants were declared mandatory during its 1997 annual conference in New Delhi, this resolution is yet to be ratified by several countries.

The CBI has filed a charge sheet against 10 accused, including three Indians. The CBI charge sheet alleges the hijackers kept in touch with Rawalpindi by means of a highly sophisticated satellite telephone.

The CBI further claims that when the authorities in Kabul refused to allow the commandeered aircraft to land, this development was relayed by the hijackers to Pakistani authorities, who then directed them to proceed to Kandahar. Islamabad, however, has refuted these charges time and again. (Herald)