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A consensus on Ayodhya

Will it be 8216;8216;litigation8217;8217; or 8216;8216;legislation8217;8217; that settles the Ayodhya issue? For ten years we have a...

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Will it be 8216;8216;litigation8217;8217; or 8216;8216;legislation8217;8217; that settles the Ayodhya issue? For ten years we have argued each other into the ground until sheer exhaustion has set in. In the process, the few voices that urged negotiation were drowned out. Perhaps it took a Nobel Peace laureate, no less, to point out the possibility of that third route!

Judging by the reactions to the Dalai Lama8217;s appeal to men of good faith on all sides of the Ayodhya dispute, there are many who now agree that some kind of consensus is better than either 8216;8216;litigation8217;8217; or 8216;8216;legislation8217;8217;. Frankly, I never understood the attraction of either of those two procedures. Both are adversarial in nature. In court, two sides argue 8212; a sinister verb 8212; their case. In the legislature, a division 8212; another unhappy word 8212; shall follow debate. Both are ill-suited for resolving something as sensitive as the Ayodhya imbroglio. Most telling of all, the Supreme Court itself urged a consensus through negotiation ten years ago when the Ayodhya issue was brought before it.

8216;8216;This is a matter suited essentially to a process of resolution by negotiations which does not end in a winner and a loser, while adjudication leads to that end. It is in the national interest that there is no loser at the end of the process adopted for resolution of the dispute so that the final outcome does not leave behind rancour in anyone. This can be achieved on the basis of a negotiated solution on the basis of which a decree can be obtained in terms of such solution in these suits. Unless a solution is found which leaves everyone happy, it cannot be the beginning of continued harmony between 8216;we the people of India8217;8217;8217;.

What exactly is the Supreme Court saying here to all those votaries of a 8216;8216;judicial solution8217;8217;? It is clearly stating the various parties should go away, resolve the issue by talking to each other, and then come back with an answer. It has taken us ten years, but we finally seem to be accepting their Lordships8217; advice8230;

I am happy that the Dalai Lama8217;s appeal has been received so well by the leaders of both the Hindu and the Muslim communities. The Deputy Prime Minister has promised that the Government of India shall be active in trying to bring about a solution. The RSS spokesman has said his organisation greets the initiative. On the other side of the fence, prominent leaders such as the Diwan-e-Sharief of Ajmer and the Shahi Imam of Delhi too have welcomed the move.

Yet, even in the midst of the euphoria, we ignore the lessons of history at our own peril. Why did Ayodhya become a national problem? How did an issue that barely drew any headlines in 1949 8212; when the idol of Rama appeared in the disputed structure 8212; become the issue that inflamed passions across India? It is incorrect to say that the Ayodhya dispute was entirely the creation of a group of desperate politicians; the records of the East India Company speak of the conflict, which means that it is at least over a century and a half old. But was it even mentioned in the first manifesto of the Jan Sangh when that party was founded fifty years ago?

I think the turning point was the Rajiv Gandhi ministry8217;s ill-advised decision to overturn the Supreme Court verdict in the Shah Bano case through an Act of Parliament. The decision seems to have been taken overnight. I remember Arif Mohammed Khan, then a junior minister, making a brilliant speech in the Lok Sabha about the liberal face of Islam; barely twenty-four hours later his leaders were urging Parliament to amend the laws in favour of the reactionaries! Who, I wonder, convinced Rajiv Gandhi to move against his own instincts?

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At any rate, alarmed at the storm that this in turn provoked, the then prime minister decided to play the Hindu card before the 1989 General Election. The locks on the doors of the temporary temple were opened and a Shilanyas was performed. Just in case anyone had not yet got the point, Rajiv Gandhi waved off the Congress campaign for 1989 at a rally in Ayodhya, promising a return to 8216;8216;Ram Rajya8217;8217;!

Twelve months later, the Chandrashekhar ministry was in power with Congress backing. A settlement on Ayodhya was all but signed when some busybody convinced Rajiv Gandhi that it would boost Chandrashekhar at the expense of the Congress; Rajiv Gandhi then put his veto on the process 8212; another mistake against his own gut instinct as he would later admit. If it was difficult to negotiate a settlement in the pre-Shah Bano era, it became all but impossible in the aftermath of Rajiv Gandhi8217;s errors.

We have had to wait almost twenty years before the hopes of a solution through litigation finally gave way to the logic of a solution through negotiation. I am sure the Supreme Court will be happy to put its imprimatur on any reasonable settlement. Their Lordships have in the past shown themselves willing to accommodate any practical request.

I remember a case when the Supreme Court was called to judge a Shia-Sunni squabble over a graveyard in Varanasi. The issue was settled in favour of one sect. The Uttar Pradesh ministry feared communal riots if the verdict were enforced. The Supreme Court then announced that its own decree need not be implemented. We have some miles to go before the Ayodhya issue is put to sleep, but if we stumble it won8217;t be the fault of the Supreme Court.

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