‘Employer’s discretion ends where employee’s dignity begins,’ Supreme Court reinstates TSRTC driver prematurely retired over colour blindness

The court’s decision, delivered by a bench comprising Justices J K Maheshwari and Aravind Kumar on August 1, not only vindicated the appellant, Ch Joseph, but also laid down a crucial precedent regarding an employer’s constitutional obligation to accommodate employees who acquire a disability during service.

The case stems from a routine medical enquiry, which declared Joseph, appointed as a driver in 2014, medically unfit for his position due to colour blindness. The TSRTC subsequently issued orders retiring him from service, while rejecting his request for alternate employment. Though he relied on a 1979 Memorandum of Settlement (MOS), which stated that the ‘drivers’ would be provided with alternate employment, the Telangana High Court gave its verdict in favour of the Corporation, directing Joseph to make representation for seeking his benefits.

In his appeal before the Supreme Court, Joseph contended that the 1979 MOS between the then-undivided Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (APSRTC) and the recognised unions is binding on the TSRTC, and the appellant, being a driver of the Corporation, was entitled to alternate employment. He said the high court failed to appreciate that his case falls within the category of people who have acquired the disability during service and thus would be entitled to alternate employment.

The counsel for TSRTC informed the court that the 1979 clause was replaced by another clause in 1986 MOS, which said a possible suitable alternate job will be identified to the extent possible, and in case it is not possible, additional monetary benefit will be given. The TSRTC rejected Joseph’s claim for an alternate job as he was an illiterate person without a qualification.

Among several other grounds to set aside the high court order, the Supreme Court noted that he was prematurely retired from his service without any “demonstrable effort” by the Corporation to identify or assess the feasibility of alternative employment, despite the appellant having expressed willingness to be reassigned to a non-driving post. The apex court said that colour blindness, though a disqualification for driving, does not render the appellant unfit to serve in any other non-driving role. The court also said that the 1979 MOS clause that the Corporation claimed to have replaced “remains valid and enforceable” and added that no internal circular can override the terms of such a binding settlement.

The Supreme Court also noted that retirement on medical grounds must be a measure of last resort, only after the employer exhausts all reasonable avenues for redeployment. “This principle is inherent in the concept of ‘reasonable accommodation’, which is now recognised as an aspect of substantive equality under Articles 14 and 21,” the court stated, adding that the failure to explore alternate jobs was not merely a procedural lapse but a “substantive illegality that violates the Appellant’s right to livelihood and equal treatment.”

Further, the court stated, “Our concern is not confined to the facts of the present case but extends to the systemic risk that employers, particularly public sector entities, may attempt to bypass their obligation to offer alternate employment by drawing rigid distinctions between recognised and unrecognised disabilities under statutory frameworks.” The court said that the obligation to “reasonably accommodate” such employees is not just a matter of administrative grace, but a constitutional and statutory imperative, rooted in the principles of non-discrimination, dignity, and equal treatment.

The judgment added that the court was not crossing a line by intervening when an employee is removed from service for a condition he did not choose, and where viable alternatives are ignored, the court is upholding one drawn by the Constitution itself. “The employer’s discretion ends where the employee’s dignity begins,” it concluded.