Military Digest: 70 Infantry Brigade and the ‘less’ recalled battles of Ladakh’s Batalik sector

Thus, while the actions of 8 Mountain Division are much highlighted in media accounts and remembrances, there is comparative silence about the actions under 3 Infantry Division. This may well be because the 3 Division hierarchy at the time is looked upon with disfavour for letting the intrusions take place.

In an earlier conversation with The Indian Express, Brig Devinder Singh (retd), who commanded 70 Infantry Brigade with perhaps the largest number of battalions in the entire theatre of operations, had recounted the superb performance of officers and troops under his command in the Batalik sector.

“They managed to have a very high sense of morale and the urge to undertake a mission and do the job. That was also because of the leadership at the junior level and the bond they had with the troops. That really paid off. But the fact is that when you have to take on these operations, you have to be far-far superior to the defender. Once I had the correct ratio of attacking troops to take on the defending enemy at heights, we started achieving success,” he said.

Brig Devinder said one drawback which his brigade faced was that they were operating far from the roadhead and many troops were involved in logistic operations. “Drass had the advantage of being on the roadhead but in Batalik there was nothing and everything had to be carted and which used almost 50 per cent of your troops only in dumping supplies,” he said.

A lot of improvisation

Troops and commanders in the Batalik sector had to improvise a lot too. According to the former brigade commander, the whole “game” was about improvisation.

“3 Infantry Div were on lower priority. 8 Mountain Div had come in prepared and they came up with adequate force levels with well defined features in front. They had Tololing and Tiger Hill as major objectives with a full division to take them. Whereas in Batalik we had the Jubbar ridgeline, Khalubar, Kukarthang and two other ridgelines spread over a huge area. Also in 3 Infantry Div, we got troops in penny pockets and it was all based on readjustment based on various sectors,” he said.

He pointed out that the Kargil Review Committee report says that the intrusions were spotted on May 3, they were confirmed on May 7, the responsibility was given to 70 Brigade (Brig Devinder’s brigade) on May 8, and on the following two days two battalions were released to the brigade—1/11 GR and 12 JAK LI.

“But on the ground instead of 800 troops in one battalion, there were only 299 and the other one had fewer than 300 troops. These were deinducting battalions and there were leave parties that had gone to Nepal from 1/11 GR. In the other battalion, a major chunk had gone to the new location to take over and handed over all their major battalion support weapons. They were in a holiday mood in Leh with just a few junior officers. But the report gives the impression that these were fully equipped equipment,” he said.

‘Panicky orders’

Brig Devinder recalled that in the initial stages there were “panicky orders” to quickly reduce the size of the intrusion before reporting the full facts to the government. “Till that time there were attempts to hem in the intrusion. What I am trying to say is that there was a need at the time to balance the orders given by higher HQs and the condition of the troops on the ground, seeing the shortage in numbers. The casualties would have been far more had we not gone steady,” he said.

According to Brig Devinder, the Kargil intrusion plan of the Pakistan Army was tactically a brilliant plan but strategically unsustainable.

“A war game which took place in April, one month before this whole episode was detected, I played the same scenario and this is the exact same how it happened in the conflict. I was asked why should the enemy do an intrusion and not an infiltration because that was the mindset of the Corps Commander. I said because they will be able to say that I have intruded into Indian territory and installed the flag. The GOC was not much convinced. In the war game, playing the enemy commanders’ role I had also asked for two more battalions to interdict the national highway,” he said.

“In the real conflict, had the Pakistanis come down in Dras from the heights and taken hold of the town, it would have taken a long time to get them cleared from it. This would have created major implications for us even though we had the Manali-Leh highway open. It would have made the task of dislodging them very, very, very difficult,” he said.