A public inquiry into the tragic Grenfell Tower fire, which claimed the lives of 72 people in 2017, concluded on Wednesday that a "culmination of decades of failure" by both the government and the construction industry led to the disaster. The inquiry's report outlined how various parties, including the government, local council, architects, contractors, and management firms, all played significant roles in the catastrophe by allowing the building's exterior to be clad with flammable materials. The government The report was critical of the government, which at the time was led by former Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May. It highlighted that the government had numerous opportunities over the years to identify and mitigate the risks associated with the use of combustible cladding and insulation in high-rise buildings. Despite receiving several warnings, the government failed to act. In 2001, the government disregarded the alarming results of a large-scale test that demonstrated the dangers of flammable cladding and did not communicate these risks to the construction industry. After the 2009 fire at Lakanal House, another high-rise block in South London, the government's focus on deregulation led to a neglect of crucial safety matters. Inquiry chair Martin Moore-Bick stated that previous governments and other entities failed to revise guidance on external wall construction, laying the groundwork for the disaster. Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), the local authority, was found to have failed in scrutinizing the design and choice of materials for Grenfell Tower's refurbishment. The report noted that RBKC did not ensure the building met safety requirements upon the completion of the work. This failure placed considerable responsibility for the dangerous condition of the building on RBKC. The report criticized both RBKC and the central government for their "muddled, slow, indecisive, and piecemeal" response to the Grenfell fire and the needs of the victims, demonstrating a "marked lack of respect for human decency and dignity." Many victims felt abandoned by the authorities, relying solely on volunteer support. Elizabeth Campbell, leader of Kensington and Chelsea Council, issued an "unreserved" apology, acknowledging that "profits were put before people," and recognizing the failure at every level of the system. Tenant Management Organisation The Tenant Management Organisation (TMO), which managed Grenfell Tower, shared responsibility with RBKC for the building's fire safety. The report noted that TMO's decision to use ACM panels in an attempt to cut refurbishment costs contributed to the disaster. Additionally, TMO did not exercise adequate care in selecting the architect or addressing fire safety concerns. The firms The report attributed a significant portion of the blame to companies involved in the cladding and insulation of Grenfell Tower, accusing them of "systematic dishonesty." It revealed that some firms manipulated testing processes, misrepresented data, and misled the market. Arconic, a French subsidiary of the American company, manufactured and sold the ACM cladding. The report stated that from 2005 until after the fire, Arconic "deliberately concealed from the market the true extent of the danger" posed by its cladding. In response, Arconic maintained that its product was safe and legal, asserting that it did not conceal information or mislead any certification body, customer, or the public. Arconic also stated that its subsidiary cooperated fully with the inquiry. Celotex and Kingspan, which produced foam insulation, were also implicated. Celotex was accused of attempting to deceive customers and the market to gain entry into the insulation market for high-rise buildings. Kingspan sold insulation deemed unsuitable for external use in high-rise structures. Kingspan defended itself by stating that the type of insulation it provided was not the primary cause of the fire's spread; rather, it was the ACM cladding, which Kingspan did not manufacture. The company acknowledged past failings but emphasized that these did not reflect its current practices. Architects and other contractors The report criticized all involved in designing the external walls and choosing materials, including architectural firm Studio E. Studio E had initially preferred zinc rainscreen panels but chose ACM panels largely due to cost considerations. Construction contractor Rydon offered significant savings through its association with the cladding subcontractor, Harley. The inquiry noted that all three parties approached their contractual obligations with a degree of casualness. Harley, the subcontractor responsible for the cladding, did not adequately address fire safety concerns. Studio E was criticized for a "cavalier attitude" towards fire safety regulations, while Rydon and Harley relied on their previous experience rather than thorough technical analysis. Fire safety inspectors Exova, instructed by Studio E on behalf of TMO, prepared a draft fire safety strategy that was never completed. London Fire Brigade The London Fire Brigade (LFB) was also scrutinized. Following the Lakanal House fire, the report suggested that the LFB should have recognized shortcomings in its ability to manage high-rise fires and applied its knowledge more effectively. The LFB was found ill-prepared for Grenfell due to "chronic lack of effective management and leadership" and an "unfounded assumption" that existing building regulations were adequate. Other bodies named in the report The Building Research Establishment played a role in enabling Celotex and Kingspan to market their insulation products for use in high-rise buildings. The National House Building Council was criticized for failing to ensure that its building control functions remained free of commercial pressures.
