Wide Angle

From all of this the agnostics are beginning to give expression to their doubts, in whispers so far, whether the visit is indeed on. Quite frankly, no one knows for sure, the believersincluded. It can be argued that the Americans are into the Ch-ristmas season and a flurry of activity. Also, unlike on the previous occasion, frenetic activity may not be necessary because there has been the Jaswant Singh-Strobe Talbott engagement, possibly the deepest and the most extensive set of talks in the history of Indo-US relations. Both sides know the areas of agreement and a few of disagreement.

It is also known that President Clinton is keen to come. But there seems to be a su-ggestion from those cla-iming to speak for him that a package, which addresses some of the American non-proliferation concerns, should be in place which he can then show as possible profit from the visit.

The Indian side is willing to go as far as it can to accommodate American concerns pr-ovided the package so-ught by Washington do-es not impinge on In- dia’s vital security interests. The difficulty with the nuclear debate is that it is couched in a language which neither members of parliament nor the average editorialwriter is truly conversant with. In the absence of an informed debate, exclamations like “sell-out” are met by those who imagine they would like to navigate the country out of “frozen postures”.

With all the will in the world to accommodate American concerns no government in New Delhi can proceed very far on the nuclear issue without mobilising public opinion one way or the other. One fact which has made us look exceptionally good in the world’s eyes is the strength of our democracy. By providing a sharp contrast, Pakistan has given greater visibility to our democratic institutions.

Given the strength of Indian democracy, no power, the United States above all, can expect New Delhi to make adjustment on nuclear policy without sensitising public opinion on the issue.

The 1996 cry of “not now; not ever” on the CTBT still reverberates through the consciousness of folks wh-ose opinion matters. That the Pokharan te-sts on May 11 may possibly have altered the situation, that “not now; not ever” may nolonger be relevant has to be driven home in the light of new data obtained from the May blasts.

A government can do no better than to initiate and encourage an “informed” debate which will be plausible only if the scientific community guides this debate with advice and data. Indeed, such a debate is already on.

Scientists seem to suggest that they have enough data not to require any further tests for the next “five to ten years”. In other words enough to fulfil the requirements of minimum deterrence. But surely the issue is not as simple as this. In fact it is from this stage onwards that the debate becomes arcane. Between the positions taken at the disarmament conference in Geneva in 1996, Pokharan II and now, there are a hundred questions to be asked and are being asked by those inclined to be more hawkish or cautions, depending which side of the debate you are on. Are other, independent scientists quite as sanguine about India’s nuclear future in the event of signing the CTBT? The emergingconsensus seems to be that the country’s minimum security concerns have already been met.

This leads to the other argument of the agnostics: President Clinton will demit office next year. Heavens knows what lies in store thereafter. What can one expect fr-om a lame duck President? What durable package can he offer?

The “lame duck” President argument has several weaknesses. It would be fanciful to imagine that the next US Pre-sident will have India on his itinerary in his very first year in office. In other words, forget a US presidential visit until, say 2003. And this when I heard recently from some of the most influential voices in the European foreign policy establishments that they have learnt from important Americans that Washington was seeking a new, strategic partnership with New Delhi. Since this “partnership” is wi-thout prejudice to our foreign policy interest, it is not an opportunity to be spu-rned. Britain’s Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, the Japanesse leadership, G8 are allspeaking a similar language. They all seek a new strategic partnership with one of the world’s most vibrant de-mocracies.

Should the CTBT remain a hindrance on this path into the next millennium? Since the US Congress has not ratified it, merely signing it removes ro-adblocks without imposing on us an ob-ligation to ratify.