Towards more neighbourly ties

During the early 1990s the wise patriarch of Abu Dhabi had conveyed to Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif his suggestion that the two work out political accommodation. Pakistan’s democracy is still paying the cost of the political bickering between these alternating elected leaders.

General Pervez Musharraf and President Hamid Karzai would do well to heed Shaikh Zayed’s concern and avoid further confrontation between Pakistan and Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai’s government is having difficulty in enforcing its writ over Afghanistan’s warlords and the territory controlled by them. In Kabul, his authority is constantly undermined by Defence Minister Mohammed Qasim Fahim who sees himself and his Jamiat-e-Islami as the protector of the interests of the Tajik ethnic group. Under such circumstances, Karzai needs Pakistan’s cooperation and friendship to fight terrorism and re-organise the Afghan State. President Musharraf, on the other hand, cannot afford to allow Pakistan to be sucked into a new Afghan quagmire.

In the aftermath of the US military operation in Afghanistan that removed the Taliban from power, any Pakistani involvement in Afghan affairs would amount to pitching Pakistan on collision course with the United States. The main purpose of General Musharraf’s famous U-turn after 9/11 was to avoid that very possibility. Islamabad’s avowed desire to create (or from the Afghan perspective, impose) a Pashtun-led friendly regime in Kabul after the collapse of the Soviet-backed regime in 1992 aggravated the Afghan civil war and cost Pakistan the goodwill it had accumulated during the anti-Soviet struggle. Given the ethnic affinity of Pashtun tribes on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghan border, development of radical groups in Afghanistan has domestic political implications for Pakistan in addition to foreign policy implications. The rise of the Taliban, for example, was the precursor to the recent political gains of the religious parties’ alliance, the MMA.

Recent lack of security in the Afghan countryside has led to circumstances similar to those that contributed to the rise of the Taliban in 1994-95. Then, the imposition of illegal levies on trade by warlords, smuggling and drug trafficking, coupled with general lawlessness, paved the way for the Taliban (with Pakistani backing) to seek power in the name of Islam. Despite their poor human rights record, the Taliban were widely credited with restoring sufficient security for people to carry on their daily business. Security outside Kabul is said to have deteriorated to pre-Taliban levels.

Unable to surmount the difficulties facing them, Afghan officials could easily fall into the temptation of blaming Pakistan for their country’s security problems. On the other hand, Pakistan’s establishment also includes a large number of armchair strategists who argue for a covert Pakistani role in ensuring the emergence of a pro-Pakistan faction in power in Afghanistan. The two neighbours should by now have figured out their co-dependence. Instead of playing a role in determining Afghanistan’s rulers, Pakistan needs to learn to work with whoever rules Afghanistan. Afghan leaders, on the other hand, must give their neighbour its due and avoid creating undue hostility.

Pakistan has often expressed alarm over Indian influence in Afghanistan. Following the UAE President’s advice of ‘‘working things out’’ bilaterally, Kabul should go the extra mile in assuring Pakistan that Afghanistan would not be used as a military or intelligence operations base by India against Pakistan. At the moment Pakistan’s ally, the United States, has a military presence in Afghanistan that should offset fears of any Indian encirclement of Pakistan. As for India’s non-military influence in Afghanistan, Islamabad should give some thought to President Karzai’s recent comment that he cannot refuse Indian economic assistance.

This brings us to an issue much larger than just Pakistan-Afghan relations. While Pakistan remains dependent on foreign economic assistance, ‘‘India wants to be seen as a world power by shaking off its begging bowl image’’, according to recent article in The Economist. New Delhi has informed 22 donor countries that it would not seek new government-to-government aid, once current programmes and projects end. Apart from retiring outstanding debt, and building foreign exchange reserves of $82 billion (which is more than Pakistan’s GDP), India is doubling its foreign aid budget of $ 600-700 million. That would mean that India would soon be giving more aid annually to African and Asian countries than Pakistan is scheduled to receive from the United States.

India’s global influence and prominence is increasing, partly from its economic success derived from the growth of its Information Technology (IT) sector and partly due to its political pluralism and cultural vitality. This year, Indian students will overtake their Chinese colleagues as the largest foreign student body in the United States. In the academic year 2001-02, a record 66,836 students from India were enrolled in US universities. Add to it another 20,000 Indians studying in institutions of higher education in Britain, Australia and Canada, to get an idea of India’s rising academic potential.

Freedom of the press since 1947 has led India to produce many world class journalists, several of whom contribute to their nation’s presence in the international media. Indian books and movies are a global phenomenon. Compared with that, Pakistan’s establishment can only roll out occasional ‘‘international’’ conferences on Kashmir and celebration of securing promises of more economic aid in return for strategic concerns of the world’s major powers. While Pakistan is busy collecting, and living off, the rent on its strategic location, India is busy evolving into a nation that offers other countries several forms of bilateral interests.

Pakistan’s concern with containing Indian influence has led it into complex strategies in the past, including that of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s well-wishers are concerned that General Musharraf and his colleagues might pursue the same course once again. Instead of a knee-jerk reaction to compete with India in Afghanistan and everywhere else, Pakistani leaders need to identify the source of India’s current influence. Developing a working political system and a consistently expanding economy are more important for Pakistan than persisting with playing great power games. Pakistan’s success as a nation will come, not from how its diplomats, soldiers and spooks influence the course of Afghanistan’s turbulent politics but from how it evolves from within.

(The writer is currently a visiting scholar at the Carnegie endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. He served as adviser to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto and as ambassador to Sri Lanka)