While Musharraf’s visit was a creditable achievement, four salient problems are likely to dampen the prospects for an enduring peace. Firstly, the bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan is not just bilateral, but should be a trilateral process. Notwithstanding the claims of the NC and the ruling PDP, without India and Pakistan expanding the scope of the dialogue to include militant factions and their political representatives in the APHC, the chances for a political settlement remain bleak. The former two political groupings including a few others simply don’t have the credibility to promote a durable settlement. More importantly it may help moderate the position of the separatists if they are included in the dialogue. Moreover, we have a third party in the form of Pakistan, which still retains considerable influence over militant factions. A cursory glance at the IRA’s involvement in the Northern Irish peace process and the LTTE’s current negotiations with the Sri Lankan government bears this out. The APHC is a deeply divided entity, nonetheless a commitment to engage the grouping in a trilateral dialogue would signal New Delhi’s purposiveness.Secondly, the notion that we are a status quo country and Pakistan a revisionist state needs qualification. Status quo is itself a subjective concept, particularly where claims over a piece of territory between two antagonists are involved. Further there is a third party involved here — the Kashmiri separatists with their demand for a separate state. We mince no words when we assert that militancy in Kashmir is the product of a revisionist ploy by Islamabad to hive away a region that we believe to be an integral part of India. Pakistan on the other hand sees India’s massive military presence in the state as an illegal occupation as do the separatists. Our policy vis-a-vis Pakistan and the separatists seems to be based on the dubious conviction that we can retrieve the situation that existed in the pre-insurgency days only if Pakistan stopped backing the militancy and the militants gave up their demand. Regardless of whether this ever occurs, we appear to have convinced ourselves that we can neutralise Pakistan’s strategy and overcome the insurgency by doling out a massive financial largesse to Kashmir and by holding regular elections. This is wishful thinking and a risky assumption. Pakistan would have no incentive to further relieve our security forces combating militancy in Kashmir in addition to the minimal steps it has undertaken in checking infiltration. Evidently, Musharraf’s recent visit is being viewed by many within the Pakistani establishment as a diplomatic and political sell out on Kashmir to New Delhi. Further, the impact of domestic competitive political pressures within Pakistan is likely to outweigh whatever external pressure that may be brought to bear against the General in the long run. Further, some in India have asserted that if the General could do a U-turn vis-a-vis the Taliban, why can’t he do the same in regard to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy. Yet this proposition overlooks the importance that Kashmir occupies in Pakistan and the enormous stakes Islamabad attaches to the issue. It would be a grave error if India dithers and procrastinates in a bid to play a waiting game because Islamabad is likely to become increasingly vexed if it perceives an absence of progress on key issues relating to a settlement and thus may have no option but to impose costs, which could be substantial. This was evident in the ambiguous and non-committal posture the General adopted in response to a question about the extent to which he would go to curb infiltration and stem the tide of militancy in Kashmir. Finally, Foreign Minister Natwar Singh’s recent statement that there can be no deadline or fixed timeframe for a resolution of Kashmir needs serious reconsideration. But why, after all India and Pakistan have adopted and committed to adopt a slew of CBMs. CBMs ultimately are only a means to an end they are not an end in themselves. But the more important point is that our insistence on an open-ended negotiating process stems from the belief that we can absorb the costs imposed by the militancy by persisting with our present policy of buying time. Perversely, this posture gives us no incentive to reach a political compromise, regardless of Manmohan Singh’s and Musharraf’s statement that the peace process is ‘irreversible’. In fact our position makes the process reversible. Only a shift in our current policy would signal serious intent to Pakistan that we are committed truly to a mutually acceptable settlement. Otherwise we risk squandering all the gains we have made in recent weeks and months. Ultimately, it must be recognised that a resolution of Kashmir is a political pre-requisite for movement on other key fronts such as bilateral investment and trade.The writer holds a degree in War Studies from London University
