Too dear at the price

First the factual background:

(a) Security Council expansion has been a part of the UN reforms agenda since the middle of 1992.

(b) There is a consensus among the five permanent members and their allies in the UN membership that Security Council membership should not be expanded beyond 23 or 25 members and thatthe permanent membership should be expanded by five and the non-permanent membership by four or five.

(c) This expansion should be achieved within the framework of the existing UN charter.

(d) Germany and Japan have been put forward as two confirmed candidates for new permanent seats. One each of the remaining three proposed seats is supposed to go to Africa, Latin and South America and Asia.

(e) No specific country has been endorsed by the important powers or other UN members to represent the three developing-country regions. In the absence of unanimity, the US and like-minded countries suggest that each of these regions should choose the country to represent it.

Although these suggestions have been on the table for nearly five years, there is no consensus on any definite idea for Security Council expansion.

Developments since 1996-97 are: First, a feeling that Europe and the advanced industrial countries may get over-represented in the expanded Security Council. Second, rival regional candidaciesin South America, Africa and Asia preclude the possibility of the success of a single candidate from this region (though South American countries may agree on Brazil as their sole candidate). The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) seems inclined to agree on a rotation of the African permanent seat between Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria when it sets right its human-rights record.

Asian countries have taken no initiative to resolve the competition for their seat. The Italians suggest an interim category of some permanent seats on the Security Council which should rotate amongst important countries. The Malaysian Chairman of the UN General Assembly, Razali Ismail, has suggested doing away with regional representation and electing new permanent members through voting in the General Assembly. (I am oversimplifying his proposal). His proposal seems to be finding increasing acceptance among UN members. The US is not deeply interested in an expansion, but it is clear that Japan and Germany will find a place,veto power will not be given to new permanent members, and expansion would not involve Charter revision. Some sort of framework resolution for expansion may be put to the next General Assembly session, perhaps under the umbrella of the Razali proposals.

In terms of demography, size, commitment to democracy and human rights and track record of supporting the UN, India’s claim cannot be questioned. A country of 950 million people not getting permanent representation in the UN’s apex body will make a mockery of UN reforms and Security Council expansion. We have staked our claim since 1993. While lip service has been paid to the legitimacy of the Indian claim, no country has voiced categorical support for its candidature. What militates against international and great-power support is India’s opposition to the international community’s political orientations on non-proliferation and disarmament. The BJP’s assertive postures may increase this reticence. While India is meticulous about paying its UN dues, itscapacity to improve its financial support to the UN is limited. Nor is such an increase desirable.

The Organisation of Islamic Conference and the US and its allies are not likely to support India. Developing countries will vote according to national-interest compulsions and their links with big powers which are their economic, security and technological benefactors. It would be illogical to expect unified support from the non-aligned or G-77 countries. India cannot and should not compromise its vital national-security interests for permanent membership. It must ask whether permanent membership won by compromising its national interests and without the veto power would serve its vital interests. Is there any assurance that agreeing to compromises would get us a permanent seat? Would India’s international, economic and strategic position diminish if it did not become a permanent member? Is it worth campaigning for a seat given the uncertainties about our candidature?With the expansion of the SecurityCouncil’s role on democracy, human rights, the environment, peacekeeping and peacemaking procedures, some of India’s vital interests would be met by becoming a permanent member. But it is not likely to serve our vital tangible national interests on security and development. The question does not arise of our compromising on national security. Even if we did, there is no assurance of getting a permanent seat.

While permanent membership may underline India’s importance and significance, not getting it will not diminish its significance as long as it remains strong and united. Given the uncertainties about our candidature, failure after campaigning for a permanent seat will diminish our international credibility and generate domestic trauma and criticism.

Weighing these factors, a possible approach could be not to push for a permanent seat. If this is not acceptable, we must oppose Security Council expansion on discriminatory and contradictory principles (after consulting with other countries). Many UNmembers could share this view.

In that case, we should delay the process through political and procedural means. In the worst-case scenario, we should remain supportive of the UN but assertively distance ourselves from illogical and unfair exercises in UN reform. In the meantime, we must work for political stability, a dynamic economy, technological sophistication, self-reliance and strategic power.

That could persuade the world to accept the logic of our claim.